Russia sounds alarm as New START treaty is set to expire


New START Treaty Expiry — UPSC Study Note


1. At a Glance


2. Why in the News


3. Background & Evolution

Cold War Arms-Control Lineage (Chronological):

Year Treaty/Event Significance
1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Banned nuclear tests in atmosphere, underwater, space
1968 NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Cornerstone of global non-proliferation; 191 parties
1972 SALT I + ABM Treaty First quantitative limits on US-Soviet ICBMs; anti-ballistic missiles capped
1979 SALT II Caps on delivery vehicles; never ratified by US Senate
1987 INF Treaty Eliminated all ground-launched nuclear missiles 500–5,500 km range; US withdrew 2019
1991 START I Signed by US–USSR; reduced deployed warheads to 6,000; expired 2009
1993 START II Signed; never entered into force (Russia withdrew 2002)
2002 SORT / Moscow Treaty Reduced strategic warheads to 1,700–2,200; replaced by New START
2010 New START signed (Prague, 8 April 2010) Obama–Medvedev; entered into force 5 February 2011
2021 Extended by 5 years (to 2026) Biden–Putin; maximum permissible extension under treaty text
Feb 2023 Russia suspends participation Cited Western arms to Ukraine; verification inspections halted
5 Feb 2026 Treaty expires No successor treaty; first warhead-limit-free era in 50+ years

[S1][S2][S4]


4. Core Static Facts

Treaty Mechanics: - Full name: Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms - Signed: 8 April 2010, Prague - Entry into force: 5 February 2011 - Original duration: 10 years (to 2021); extendable up to 5 more years - Extended: February 2021 (Biden-Putin, full 5-year extension) - Expiry: 5 February 2026 [S1][S2]

Key Limits (per side): - Deployed strategic warheads: ≤ 1,550 [S1] - Deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles (total launchers + bombers): ≤ 800 [S1] - Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-armed bombers: ≤ 700 [S1]

Verification Regime: - Bilateral data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections [S1] - Up to 18 on-site inspections per year per side (suspended by Russia, Feb 2023)

Key Parties & Institutions: - Parties: USA and Russian Federation only - Custodian/witness forum: None (bilateral); NPT Review Conferences provide broader context - Oversight body referenced: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Predecessor treaties subsumed: START I, SORT (Moscow Treaty)


5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Geopolitical / Strategic

Legal / Constitutional (International Law Dimension)

Historical

Ethical / Governance

Scientific / Technological


6. Recent Developments (Last 12–18 months)


7. Prelims Hooks

  1. New START stands for Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. [S1]
  2. New START was signed on 8 April 2010 in Prague by US President Obama and Russian President Medvedev. [S4]
  3. The treaty entered into force on 5 February 2011 and expired exactly 15 years later on 5 February 2026. [S1]
  4. New START capped deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 per side. [S1]
  5. Total nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed + non-deployed) were capped at 800 per side. [S1]
  6. Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers combined were capped at 700 per side. [S1]
  7. The treaty was extended for 5 years in February 2021 — the maximum permissible extension under its own text. [S2]
  8. Russia suspended its New START obligations in February 2023, citing NATO arms supplies to Ukraine. [S4]
  9. The INF Treaty — which New START did not replace — was withdrawn from by the US in 2019. [S3]
  10. China was never a party to New START despite being the third-largest nuclear power. [S4]
  11. New START's expiry is the first time in over 50 years (since pre-SALT I, 1972) that there are no binding US-Russia nuclear warhead limits. [S1]
  12. The UN Secretary-General described New START's expiry as a "grave moment" for international peace and security. [S2]
  13. Verification under New START included up to 18 on-site inspections per year per side. [S1]
  14. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) — the other major nuclear treaty — entered into force in January 2021 but was not signed by any nuclear-weapon state. [S2]
  15. Predecessor to New START was SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty / Moscow Treaty, 2002). [S4]

8. Mains Relevance

GS Paper mapping: - GS-II: International Relations — bilateral/multilateral agreements, India's foreign policy in a changing global order, nuclear-weapon states and disarmament. - GS-III: Internal Security — nuclear security, arms race implications for India's neighbourhood threat perceptions.

Specific syllabus headings: - "Important International Institutions, agencies and fora — their structure, mandate" (NPT, CTBT, New START) - "Bilateral, regional, and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests" - "Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests"

Plausible Mains Questions: 1. "The expiry of the New START Treaty marks the end of an era of US-Russia nuclear arms control. Examine the implications of this development for global nuclear security and India's strategic interests." (250 words, GS-II) 2. "Trace the evolution of nuclear arms-control treaties from SALT I (1972) to New START (2010). What structural weaknesses prevented the development of a comprehensive multilateral nuclear disarmament regime?" (250 words, GS-II) 3. "In the absence of binding nuclear arms-control treaties, how should multilateral bodies like the United Nations strengthen the global non-proliferation architecture?" (150 words, GS-II)


9. Related Topics to Study Next

Topic Why Connected
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Foundational treaty; New START was seen as fulfilling NPT Art. VI obligations
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Sister pillar of the disarmament regime; still not in force (India, US, China among non-ratifiers)
INF Treaty & its US withdrawal (2019) Immediate predecessor loss; context for New START being the "last" treaty
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, 2017) Competing normative framework; no nuclear-weapon state is party
India's Nuclear Doctrine No-first-use, credible minimum deterrence; context shifts with US-Russia arsenal uncertainty
China's nuclear expansion Growing from ~250 to ~500+ warheads; no bilateral limits with US or Russia
Russia-Ukraine War & its geopolitical consequences Direct proximate cause of Russia suspending New START; nuclear threats rhetoric
Hypersonic missiles & strategic stability New weapons (Avangard, US LRHW) challenge existing counting and verification rules

10. Common Errors / Trap Areas

  1. Confusing START I with New START: START I (1991, US–USSR) expired in December 2009; New START (2010) is the successor. They are different treaties with different limits.
  2. Wrong expiry year: Some aspirants mix up the 2021 extension date with the actual expiry. The treaty was extended in 2021 but expired in 2026.
  3. Assuming China is a party: New START was strictly bilateral (US-Russia); China, UK, and France were never parties, despite being NPT-recognised nuclear-weapon states.
  4. Conflating SORT and New START: SORT (Moscow Treaty, 2002) limited warheads to 1,700–2,200 but had no verification mechanism; New START replaced it with stricter limits (1,550) and a robust inspection regime.
  5. Assuming NPT = disarmament obligation enforcer: NPT Article VI calls for "good faith negotiations" but provides no enforcement mechanism; New START was the operational disarmament tool. Its expiry weakens NPT's practical meaning but does not violate NPT itself.

11. Sources