"The 2023 law on appointing the CEC and ECs puts the independence of the Election Commission at risk." Critically examine this in light of *Anoop Baranwal* (2023).

Article 324(2) makes appointments of the CEC and ECs "subject to any law made by Parliament". In Anoop Baranwal (2023), the Supreme Court filled this gap with an interim panel of the PM, the LoP and the CJI, to last until Parliament legislated [1]. The 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Union Minister [2]. The Act is constitutionally valid, but its design weakens the ECI's independence.

Risks to independence

• Executive majority: the PM and a Minister the PM nominates hold 2 of 3 votes. The LoP can dissent but cannot block an appointment [2].
• Vacancy clause: recommendations stay valid even when a seat is vacant. If the LoP seat is empty, say just before a general election, only the ruling side selects the "umpire" [2].
• Narrow eligibility: only Secretary-rank officers qualify. Judges and jurists are excluded, although the ECI performs quasi-judicial functions such as deciding disqualifications [2].
• Weak protection for ECs: an EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation alone, while the CEC has SC-judge-level protection [2].

The case for the Act

• Parliament's mandate: Anoop Baranwal itself made its panel temporary. The Act uses a power that Art. 324(2) reserves for Parliament [1].
• Separation of powers: keeping the CJI off executive panels means the judiciary does not later review appointments it helped make.
• Durability: a statute gives a settled, permanent process in place of a stop-gap court order [3].

Assessment Being valid does not make the Act adequate. The Dinesh Goswami Committee, the NCRWC (2002) and the Law Commission all proposed broad-based selection panels [3]. None gave the government a built-in majority. South Africa and the UK add judicial or parliamentary checks [2]. A curative petition has been filed against the 23 September 2026 split verdict on whether to refer the challenge to a Constitution Bench. This shows the question is still unresolved [4].

The 2023 Act fills a constitutional gap, but it gives the executive the deciding voice over the body that referees its own contests. Parliament should bar recommendations while the LoP seat is vacant, widen the panel on NCRWC lines and extend removal protection to ECs [2][3]. This would respect Parliament's authority and protect free and fair elections, which are part of the basic structure.