Does the 2023 law on appointing Election Commissioners strike the right balance between parliamentary sovereignty and the independence of the Election Commission? Discuss with reference to *Anoop Baranwal* (2023).

Article 324(2) says the President appoints the CEC and ECs "subject to any law made by Parliament" [1]. No such law existed. So in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (March 2023), a five-judge Constitution Bench set up an interim selection committee of the PM, the LoP and the CJI [1]. The 2023 Act (No. 49) replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM [1][2]. The Act uses a power Parliament clearly has, but it tilts the balance towards the executive.

Where the Act respects parliamentary sovereignty

• Constitutional mandate: Baranwal itself called its committee a stop-gap until Parliament legislated. Parliament has now legislated [1].
• No textual right for the CJI: Article 324(2) names no committee members. Under the separation of powers, courts may strike down a law but cannot rewrite it.
• Better than before 2023: a statutory committee that includes the LoP replaces appointment on executive advice alone [1].

Where it weakens EC independence

• Executive majority: the PM and the PM's own nominee hold 2 of 3 seats. PRS notes this may undermine ECI independence [1][2].
• LoP vacancy: if the Lok Sabha is dissolved before elections, the committee may contain only ruling-party members [1].
• Basic structure: free and fair elections are part of the basic structure (Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975). Baranwal held that exclusive executive control over appointments erodes this.
• Judicial limbo: the SC refused to stay appointments under the Act in March 2024 [3]. In September 2026, a two-judge Bench split under Article 145(3) on whether it could hear the challenge at all. Justice Datta found, prima facie, no independent check in the process, and the matter went to the CJI [4]. Meanwhile, commissioners chosen under the Act keep running elections.

Way forward

• Add a neutral third member, as the Law Commission's 255th Report recommended (PM, LoP, CJI) [5]. Another option is a non-executive member chosen by consensus.
• Require the LoP's (or largest opposition party leader's) presence in the quorum. Settle the case quickly before a larger Bench.

The 2023 Act validly uses Parliament's power under Article 324(2), but its executive-majority design does not deliver the balance Baranwal sought. A selection process that includes a neutral member would respect both Parliament's power and the Constitution's promise of free and fair elections. That would strengthen trust in the "guardian of elections" and in SDG 16's goal of accountable institutions.