The Aadhaar residency-based eligibility norm, while enabling financial inclusion, poses risks to national security. Critically examine.

Q. The Aadhaar residency-based eligibility norm, while enabling financial inclusion, poses risks to national security. Critically examine. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Aadhaar, issued under the Aadhaar Act, 2016 to any resident of India — including a foreign national who has stayed 182 days or more in the preceding 12 months [3] — deliberately privileges residence over citizenship. This design choice made India's welfare architecture near-universal, but it is now contested before the Supreme Court, which has asked the Centre to examine a plea restricting fresh enrolment largely to children [1].

Merits: residency as an enabler of inclusion - Universal coverage: enrolment has reached roughly 144 crore, covering almost the entire population — the migrant labourer, the homeless and the undocumented poor are not excluded for lacking citizenship papers [1]. - Welfare delivery: about 85 crore food-security beneficiaries and 55 crore Jan Dhan holders rely on Aadhaar-seeded records; the JAM trinity underpins Direct Benefit Transfer and has curbed leakages and ghost beneficiaries [4]. - Constitutional fit: the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy (2018) upheld the Act while balancing it against the right to privacy, treating Aadhaar as an identity tool, not a citizenship document [5].

Risks: the security dimension - Weak entry verification: residence proof such as a rental agreement is easy to manufacture, allowing illegal entrants to acquire Aadhaar and then build a chain of ration cards, bank accounts and passports [1]. - Organised forgery: the seizure of about 87,000 fake documents in Mumbai points to a supply-side forgery industry rather than a mere procedural gap [1]. - Technological limits: UIDAI's biometric de-duplication prevents duplicate identities but cannot verify nationality claims made through forged demographic documents [2].

The tension is real but not irreconcilable: the risk lies in verification quality at enrolment, not in the residency principle itself. Strengthening document authentication, linking child enrolment to civil birth registration, and displaying that Aadhaar is only proof of identity would protect security without disenfranchising the poor. The Court itself observed that forgery networks operate from abroad [1] — confirming that inclusive identity and robust border and intelligence management must advance together.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. SC asks Centre to examine plea on revising Aadhaar issuance norms — The Hindu, 5 May 2026 — the PIL, enrolment figure, Mumbai fake-document seizure, Court's observation on overseas forgery networks 2. Unique Identification Authority of India — About UIDAI — UIDAI's statutory status under the Aadhaar Act, 2016 and its de-duplication mandate 3. Aadhaar Enrolment — UIDAI — 182-day residency rule for resident foreign nationals; free enrolment 4. JAM (Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, Mobile) Trinity: A Decade of Financial Inclusion — PIB — Aadhaar seeding of Jan Dhan accounts, DBT and leakage reduction 5. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (26 September 2018) — Supreme Court of India — validity of the Aadhaar Act and the privacy balance