The absence of a codified framework on judicial recusal leaves the matter to individual conscience. Critically examine whether India needs statutory recusal norms.

Recusal means a judge steps aside from a case to avoid bias, real or apparent. It rests on the maxim nemo judex in causa sua. India has no law on it. The only guidance is the Supreme Court's Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997), which says justice must "be seen to be done" [1]. Justice Sheel Nagu recently recused from Punjab's appeal against a Punjab and Haryana High Court order. He had headed that High Court as Chief Justice [2]. The case shows both the strengths and the gaps of a conscience-based model.

Arguments for statutory norms

• Inconsistency: There is no written test. Similar conflicts, such as appeals from a judge's former High Court, may be handled differently by different judges.
• Opacity: Judges often recuse without giving reasons. In the NJAC case (2015), Justice Kurian Joseph said recording reasons would improve transparency and public confidence [3].
• Delay: Each recusal sends the case back to the CJI as Master of the Roster for a new Bench [2]. No time limit applies, so justice is delayed.
• Accountability: Codified grounds would let litigants and the public check whether recusal decisions are fair.

Arguments against statutory norms

• Judicial independence: If Parliament legislates on how judges hear cases, it risks intruding on the judiciary. After the NJAC verdict struck down the commission as unconstitutional, this is sensitive ground [3].
• Bench-hunting: Rigid grounds can be misused to pick a friendlier Bench. Justice Khehar held that a litigant's mere apprehension of bias does not justify recusal [3].
• Doctrine of necessity: With a limited number of judges, rigid rules could leave no Bench able to hear a case. The NJAC case addressed this [3].
• Soft law works: The Restatement already bars judges from hearing matters involving relatives [1]. Justice Nagu stepped aside voluntarily [2].

Way forward: a middle path

• The Supreme Court could adopt in-house recusal guidelines through its rule-making power under Article 145, rather than through an Act of Parliament.
• Judges should record a one-line reason for each recusal.
• The CJI should relist recusal cases within a fixed time.
• Contested recusal requests could be decided by another Bench.

Statutory norms would bring consistency but put judicial independence at risk. Leaving recusal entirely to conscience keeps independence but weakens transparency. Recusal norms that the judiciary writes itself, are published, and come with recorded reasons can balance these needs. They would ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, which upholds the guarantee of a fair hearing under Article 21.