The absence of a journalistic exemption in the DPDP Act, 2023 sets privacy against press freedom. Critically examine how constitutional courts should balance the two.

The DPDP Act, 2023 makes consent the default basis for processing personal data. Its list of "legitimate uses" does not include journalism [2]. The Digital News Publishers Association has challenged this in the Supreme Court under Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) [1]. Courts must reconcile these two fundamental rights, not rank one above the other.

Case for privacy (strengths of the law)

• Puttaswamy (2017) placed privacy within Article 21, so the press cannot simply override it [2].
• A blanket exemption risks doxxing and leaks of health records passed off as "news." It also raises a hard question: who counts as a journalist? Bloggers and data-scraping firms could claim the label.
• The Srikrishna Committee (2018) recommended balancing privacy against free speech, not exempting the press unconditionally [2].

Case for press freedom (weaknesses of the law)

• Chilling effect: Reporting on a minister's land deal would need that minister's consent, and the subject could demand erasure [2]. Penalties can reach ₹200 crore [5].
• Article 14 asymmetry: The Centre can exempt its own agencies by notification [2], and start-ups get a simplified compliance framework [4]. The press gets nothing.
• RTI squeeze: Section 44(3) rewrites RTI Section 8(1)(j). The Government points to Section 8(2)'s public-interest override [3], but it has not written into the law any protection for journalism.

How courts should balance

• Two-way proportionality: Apply Puttaswamy's test of legitimate aim, necessity and least-restrictive means [2] to curbs on the press as well as to intrusions on privacy. A blanket consent rule likely fails it.
• Read down, don't strike down: Hold that consent and erasure duties do not apply to bona fide public-interest journalism about people in public life.
• Structured factors: Weigh how sensitive the data is, its relevance to the public and the person's public role, as the Srikrishna Committee suggested [2].
• Article 19(2) discipline: Any residual curb on reporting must pass the test of reasonable restrictions.
• Institutional nudge: Ask MeitY to notify a journalistic carve-out using the route it already used for start-ups [4].

Privacy and press freedom both protect human dignity and democratic accountability. Courts should combine a proportionality-based reading-down now with codification by Parliament later. That honours Puttaswamy and the Preamble's promise of liberty of expression, so that data protection shields citizens, not the powerful, from scrutiny.