AFSPA has been progressively withdrawn yet re-imposed in Manipur. Critically examine whether the Act is an effective counter-insurgency tool.

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 lets troops use force, arrest without warrant and search premises in "disturbed areas" [1]. Manipur's cycle of rollback and re-imposition shows that the Act can contain violence. It cannot end insurgency on its own.

Strengths: where AFSPA works

• Operational cover: soldiers can search, stop and arrest quickly. Section 6 bars prosecution without prior Central sanction [3].
• Containment record: as security improved after 2014, disturbed-area status was withdrawn from Tripura (2015) and Meghalaya (2018) [2].
• Calibrated use: in 2022 it was lifted from 15 police-station areas in 6 Manipur districts [2]. Coverage is now notified by police station rather than by whole State [1].
• Crisis backstop: the MHA restored AFSPA after the ethnic conflict of 3 May 2023 broke down civil policing [1].

Weaknesses: where it falls short

• Treats symptoms, not causes: the reversal shows that withdrawal followed levels of violence. The ethnic grievances behind it remain unresolved [1].
• "Temporary" becomes permanent: renewals come six months at a time [1]. Even so, Nagaland stayed wholly "disturbed" from 1995 until 2022 [2]. Orders list areas without published reasons [1].
• Accountability gap: at Oting, Mon district (December 2021), 14 villagers were killed in a botched operation [4]. Because of the sanction rule, the Centre decides whether its own troops can be tried [3]. This feeds the alienation that insurgents exploit.
• Perceived partiality: the October 2026 order exempts 13 police stations in five Valley districts but covers the hills [1]. That map follows the conflict's own hill–Valley fault line.
• Weak exit path: leaning on the Army delays building State police capacity, and the police are what allow AFSPA to be withdrawn.

Way forward

• Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005): repeal AFSPA and move the powers still needed into UAPA, 1967 [5].
• Publish district-wise reasons with every renewal.
• Set time-bound sanction decisions that come with written reasons.
• Modernise State police and pursue political dialogue in parallel.

On balance, AFSPA is an effective containment instrument but not a complete counter-insurgency strategy. If its calibrated use is combined with transparency, accountability, police reform and dialogue, as the Jeevan Reddy Committee envisaged [5], India can protect both security and the Article 21 guarantee of life and dignity. Withdrawal would then last instead of being reversed.