The anti-defection law has curbed individual defections but has been circumvented through resignations and bypolls. Critically examine, and suggest reforms.

The Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985) disqualifies a legislator who voluntarily gives up party membership or defies the party whip. It has largely stopped open floor-crossing, but legislators now get around it by resigning rather than defecting. In October 2026 the Supreme Court dismissed a plea over alleged horse-trading in Tamil Nadu, which shows this gap is still open [4].

Where the law has worked

• Fewer individual defections: the Y.B. Chavan Committee found that 542 MLAs switched sides between 1951 and 1967, and 116 of 210 defectors in seven States became ministers [1].
• Group defection made harder: the 91st Amendment (2003) removed the one-third "split" exception [2].
• Judicial check: the Speaker acts as a tribunal whose decisions courts can review. The SC (2020) said these petitions must be decided within a reasonable time [2].

Where it has been circumvented

• Resign-and-recontest: governments in Karnataka (2019) and Madhya Pradesh (2020) fell when MLAs resigned and then re-contested on the ticket of the party that gained [1].
• Bypoll door left open: in Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil (2019), the SC set aside a Speaker's order barring disqualified MLAs from contesting until the House's term ended [3].
• Courts cannot close the gap: the SC dismissed a 2026 plea asking it to use Art. 142 to bar such MLAs from bypolls and recover bypoll costs from them [4].
• Merger loophole: a two-thirds "merger" is still protected [2].
• Side effects: the law gives party leaders "immense power to stamp out internal dissent" [1]. The Speaker is a party member, which creates a conflict of interest and leads to delays [2].

Reforms

• Independent adjudicator: the Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) recommended taking defection cases away from Speakers [1]. Another proposal is that the President or Governor decide, on the ECI's advice [2].
• Delete the merger exception: recommended by the Law Commission's 170th Report [5].
• Cut the reward: extend Art. 164(1B) so that members who resign cannot become ministers until they are re-elected. Voters would still decide the bypoll.
• Narrow the whip to confidence and money votes, as Pakistan's Art. 63A does [1].

The Tenth Schedule has disciplined individual defectors, but it penalises membership rather than the pursuit of office. Parliament, not the courts, should close the resignation route through independent adjudication and by removing the ministerial reward. This would protect the voter's mandate while keeping room for honest dissent.