Aquaculture now dominates India's fish output, but risk protection lags behind. Critically examine how PM-MKSSY addresses the insurance gap in the Blue Revolution.

Aquaculture now supplies about 74% of India's fish output [1]. Yet most fish farmers are small, work on thin margins and face disease, floods and cyclones without cover [1]. PM-MKSSY is a ₹6,000-crore Central Sector sub-scheme under PMMSY running from FY 2023-24 to FY 2026-27 [2]. It is India's first targeted attempt to close this gap. Its design is sound, but uptake shows it is not yet enough.

How PM-MKSSY addresses the gap

• Affordability: a one-time incentive of 40% of the premium, capped at ₹25,000/ha and ₹1 lakh for up to 4 ha, aimed at small farmers [1].
• Risk coverage: Basic cover protects against summer kill, floods, cyclones and pollution. Comprehensive cover adds disease [3].
• Inclusion: SC, ST and women farmers get an extra 10% incentive. Intensive systems such as RAS, biofloc and cages are covered for units up to 1,800 m³ [3].
• Formalisation: payment by DBT through the NFDP links insurance with credit and traceability [1][2].

Limitations

• Poor uptake: only 262 applications covering 710 ha had reached insurers, against a target of 1 lakh ha [4].
• Cost left with the farmer: the farmer still pays 60% of the premium upfront, and the incentive covers only one crop cycle [1]. The scheme's term ends in FY 2026-27, possibly before farmers form an insurance habit [2].
• Insurers' risk is unchanged: India's 1990s shrimp insurance had loss ratios of 84–524%, mostly because of white spot disease, and insurers pulled out [5]. A premium subsidy does not make disease risk easier to price. This matters because frozen shrimp earns about 66% of seafood export revenue [1].
• Low trust in claims: the published scheme details set no claim-settlement deadline. PMFBY's claims were delayed by data disputes and late subsidy release [6]. Fish losses underwater are even harder to verify.

Way forward

• Adopt PMFBY's 12% automatic penalty for late claims [7], and publish each insurer's settlement time on NFDP.
• Taper the incentive over several crop cycles instead of ending it after one.
• Use group policies through cooperatives and state reinsurance, as Japan did. By 2004, Japan insured about 37% of its fish and crustacean aquaculture output [5].

PM-MKSSY rightly uses affordability and formalisation as entry points. But insurance works only when farmers trust claim payments and insurers can price disease risk. If the scheme is extended beyond FY 2026-27 with tapered support, time-bound settlement and backing for insurers, the Blue Revolution's output gains can become secure livelihoods, advancing SDG 1 and SDG 14.