ASEAN-led defence mechanisms like ADMM-Plus offer India a low-cost, high-legitimacy platform for Indo-Pacific engagement. Discuss with reference to recent naval engagements.

The ADMM-Plus is ASEAN's defence forum. It brings ASEAN members together with eight Dialogue Partners, including the US, China and Russia [3]. In September 2026 India sent INS Sahyadri and INS Kulish to the 23rd ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Joint Cooperation Activity at Subic Bay, Philippines [1]. The deployment shows how the forum gives India strategic returns for a modest cost, though those returns have clear limits.

Low cost

• Uses deployments already under way: Sahyadri had earlier sailed with the Eastern Fleet to the South China Sea. It called at Kemaman, Malaysia [4] and exercised with the Philippine Navy before a port call at Manila [5].
• Non-combat agenda: The Sea Phase covered search and rescue, casualty evacuation, hydrographic survey and deck-landing qualification [1]. These drills build interoperability without expensive high-end exercises.
• Shared burden: The Philippine Navy hosted and Japan co-chaired [1]. India co-chairs the Counter-Terrorism EWG with Malaysia for 2024–27 [3]. Rotating leadership spreads the organisational cost.

High legitimacy

• ASEAN centrality: India's presence in the South China Sea comes inside a framework that ASEAN leads by consensus, so it is hard to paint as bloc politics. The Raksha Mantri noted that "regional ownership builds legitimacy" [2].
• Inclusive membership: China, the US and Russia take part side by side [3]. This lets India say its stress on freedom of navigation is "not against any country" [2].
• Policy coherence: The deployment advances Act East and MAHASAGAR [1]. It also showcases an indigenously designed and built frigate [4].

Limitations

• Lowest-common-denominator agenda: Every activity needs consensus, and China is a member. So contested-waters issues stay off the table, and the drills avoided them [1].
• Non-binding outcomes: The ANCM-GMI discussed in the Harbour Phase are guidelines, not treaty obligations [1].
• Symbolism risk: Two ships for five days add little deterrence. Partners such as the Philippines may expect firmer support.

ADMM-Plus therefore gives India a cheap and credible way into Indo-Pacific security, but it is not a tool for settling disputes. India should use the trust it builds as a base for deeper bilateral and minilateral cooperation. It could also seek to co-chair the Maritime Security EWG. Both steps fit MAHASAGAR's vision of an open, inclusive, UNCLOS-based Indo-Pacific [2].