The auction regime introduced in 2015 has improved transparency but not operationalisation of mineral blocks. Critically examine.

The MMDR Amendment, 2015 and the Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2015 replaced discretionary allotment of mineral concessions with competitive bidding [1]. Ten years later the statement is largely valid. Auctions have changed how blocks are allotted, but they have done far less to decide whether those blocks become working mines.

Transparency: gains and gaps

• Competitive bidding replaced discretion, and the number of auctions keeps rising. 442 blocks had been auctioned by December 2024 [2]. That reached 585 by December 2025, including a record 141 in 2025 alone [1].
• More states have joined. Assam and Uttarakhand auctioned blocks for the first time in 2025 [1].
• Central auctions for critical minerals came with the 2023 amendment, which added national capacity [3].
• Gaps remain where states lack capacity. The CAG checked 119 minor-mineral leases in Jharkhand and found irregularities in 44, including 8 on forest land [4].

Operationalisation: the real deficit

• Only 79 of 585 auctioned blocks are operational, roughly one in seven [1].
• Clearances are slow. Forest clearance takes up to 34 months and environmental clearance about 26 months for commercial coal blocks [5]. Non-coal blocks go through the same clearance process.
• Land records are poor. Outdated forest records, separate state approvals and the need for Gram Sabha consent all add delay [5].
• Exploration risk is high. Many blocks are offered as composite licences at early exploration stages [1]. The resource estimates are uncertain, so bids may turn out to be unviable.

Course correction underway

• Fixed timelines now run from the Letter of Intent to the lease deed, with penalties for delay caused by the bidder [1].
• A 50% premium rebate applies to early production [1].
• The 2026 Second Amendment Rules allow unfeasible parts of a block to be excluded and create a Unified Mining Portal [6].
• Funding for NMEDT, the national exploration trust, rose from 2% to 3% of royalty [1].

Overall, the auction regime has made allotment largely transparent, though oversight at the state level is still weak. Its main weakness lies after the auction. The way forward is:

• digitised land maps, as the Standing Committee recommended [5];
• using NMEDT funds to explore blocks further before they are auctioned;
• time-bound single-window clearances.

These steps would turn auctions into production and serve Article 39(b), which directs that material resources be used for the common good.