The Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024 seeks to modernise India's civil aviation regulation. Examine its key features and their implications for safety oversight.

The Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024 (Act No. 16 of 2024) [1] replaced the colonial-era Aircraft Act, 1934, while retaining most of its provisions [2]. It updates the legal basis of aviation regulation. However, safety oversight remains structurally dependent on the executive.

Key features

• Three statutory bodies: DGCA for safety regulation, BCAS for security and AAIB for accident investigation [3].
• Aircraft design is now regulated, in addition to manufacture and operation [3].
• The Centre can make rules on licensing, certification and inspection to implement the Chicago Convention, 1944 [3].
• Two-tier appeals go to a First and then a Second Appellate Officer. Appeals against DGCA or BCAS orders then go to the Central Government [3].
• Penalties are imposed by an Adjudicating Officer of Deputy Secretary rank or above [3].

Implications: strengths

• Firmer legal footing for DGCA's Civil Aviation Requirements (CARs). The 2026 CAR on gyroplane pilot training shows the framework can license new aircraft categories [4].
• Design regulation moves safety checks upstream to the drawing board.
• ICAO alignment helps Indian licences gain international acceptance.
• A separate AAIB keeps accident investigation apart from the regulator whose rules may be at fault.

Implications: concerns

• No regulatory independence: the Centre supervises DGCA and may modify or cancel its orders. The DG's qualifications, selection and tenure are not specified. Telecom, electricity and insurance, by contrast, have independent regulators [5].
• Conflict of interest: the same ministry promotes aviation growth and controls the body that judges its safety.
• Appeals end within the executive, with no further appeal [5].
• Capacity deficit: nearly 50% of DGCA's sanctioned posts are vacant, and DGCA cannot recruit on its own. It detects safety lapses but is weak at getting them rectified (Standing Committee, 2025) [6].
• Fragmented oversight: state agencies run high-risk helicopter operations with limited central supervision [6].

The Act modernises aviation's legal architecture but not the institutional design of safety oversight. The way forward is to revisit the lapsed Civil Aviation Authority Bill, 2013, which proposed an independent regulator [5]. The Standing Committee's recommendations should also be implemented: statutory autonomy, specialised recruitment, competitive pay, time-bound closure of safety findings and uniform national rules for helicopter operations [6]. An independent, well-staffed regulator would make India's Chicago Convention commitment to safe skies credible.