Bilateral naval exercises have moved from goodwill gestures to instruments of interoperability and strategic signalling. Examine with reference to India's exercises with European navies.

Bilateral naval exercises once meant port calls and passage drills to show friendship. India's exercises with European navies, such as KONKAN (UK) and Varuna (France), now test whether the navies can fight together and signal shared strategic goals. They still have limits.

From goodwill to interoperability

• Complex serials: KONKAN-26 off Plymouth (INS Trishul with HMS Sutherland) practised anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface asymmetric warfare and weapon firings in a multi-threat environment [1].
• Standards-based training: the Royal Navy's FOST conducted it. The Indian ship was tested against Royal Navy training standards, which is more than a friendly manoeuvre [1].
• Force-level integration: KONKAN-25 paired the INS Vikrant carrier battle group with the UK Carrier Strike Group led by HMS Prince of Wales. Together they ran anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine and flying operations [2].

Instrument of strategic signalling

• Extra-regional reach: operating off Plymouth shows the Indian Navy can deploy far beyond the Indian Ocean [1].
• Minilateral pull: Norwegian and Japanese ships and aircraft sailed in the UK group in 2025 [2]. This signals that Indo-Pacific interests are converging.
• Aatmanirbharta on display: fielding the indigenous INS Vikrant [3] presents India as a capable partner, not merely a buyer.
• Anchored in frameworks: KONKAN-25 was presented as part of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership under Vision 2035 [2]. The 2025 Joint Statement commits both sides to a Regional Maritime Security Centre of Excellence under IPOI [4].

Limits of the shift

• Self-reported outcomes: the gains are claimed only in the Ministry of Defence release. No independent assessment exists [1].
• Scale volatility: two carrier groups in 2025 shrank to two frigates and a four-day sea phase in 2026 [1][2].
• Opportunity cost: capital outlay for 2021–26 faces a 48% shortfall, and the Navy's main threats lie in the Indian Ocean. A frigate abroad is one less on patrol at home [5].
• Drills are not platforms: exercises train crews but cannot fill shortages of ships and aircraft.

KONKAN shows that India's European exercises have grown into real tools of interoperability and signalling, but their value depends on follow-through. Three steps would turn signals into substance for a secure, rules-based Indo-Pacific:

• finalise the electric-propulsion Inter-Governmental Agreement that builds on the 2024 Statement of Intent [4][6];
• add anti-piracy and disaster-relief serials;
• review outcomes every year under Vision 2035.