Central Sector Schemes increasingly depend on State machinery to be delivered. Analyse the governance problems this creates, with suitable examples.

The Union funds Central Sector Schemes in full and is meant to run them through its own agencies. In practice, many reach citizens only through State exams, records and officers. Under the National Means-cum-Merit Scholarship Scheme (NMMSS), the Centre pays ₹12,000 a year through the National Scholarship Portal (NSP). But States run the selection exam, and State, district and school nodal officers verify applications [1]. The result is a gap between who pays and who delivers.

Why the dependence arises

• The Centre has no field staff of its own. States control the schools, land records and district administration.
• PM-KISAN is 100% Union-funded, yet States identify and validate the beneficiary farmers [2].

Centre (funds, NSP) → State (exam, SNO) → District (DNO) → School (INO) → Student
        each arrow = a separate point of possible failure

Fig: NMMSS delivery chain

Governance problems

• Accountability gap: The Centre pays but cannot compel a State to hold its exam on time. The Ministry's own December 2025 review flagged exam conduct and quota utilisation as problems [3].
• Coordination failure: The 2026–27 NMMSS deadline was extended twice, from 31 Aug to 30 Sep to 31 Oct. Even after the first extension, there were only 88,522 fresh applications against a 1-lakh quota [4].
• Last-mile capacity deficit: At the Bhopal workshop (Oct 2026), even district and institute nodal officers needed a live portal demonstration [1]. When officers lack digital skills, poor students who cannot complete the process are left out.
• Weak State ownership: States carry the administrative load of a scheme that the Centre brands and funds. It therefore competes with the States' own priorities and gets less attention.
• Fragmented data, input-based targets: Beneficiary data sits in State records [2]. Progress towards "100% saturation" is reported in applications filed, not students who complete school [1][4].
• Training in place of reform: The Ministry holds review workshops every year [3], but delays keep recurring because the State and Central calendars do not line up.

Together, these problems turn a design that saves the Centre field staff into a delivery chain that is only as strong as its weakest link. The way forward:

• joint Centre–State calendars written into scheme guidelines
• recognition of States' delivery performance
• capacity building at the last mile
• outcome tracking that links beneficiary IDs to UDISE+ school data

Shared ownership of this kind would deliver on cooperative federalism and advance SDG 4 (quality education).