The Collegium system has survived the NJAC challenge, but its legitimacy deficit persists. Discuss reforms that would improve transparency without compromising judicial independence.

Under Article 124, the President appoints Supreme Court judges. In practice, a Collegium of the CJI and four senior-most judges decides who is appointed [1]. In 2015 the Court struck down the NJAC, holding that executive involvement impinges on judicial independence [1]. The Collegium therefore keeps its primacy, but its process still lacks legitimacy.

Why the legitimacy deficit persists

• Opacity: it deliberates behind closed doors and has no published selection criteria [1].
• Accountability gap: judges choose judges with no outside check. This concern drove the Constitution (120th Amendment) Bill, 2013, which proposed a Judicial Appointments Commission [2].
• Ad hoc diversity: in October 2026 the Chief Justices of the Gujarat, Delhi and Telangana High Courts, including Justice Sunita Agarwal, were elevated together [3]. Regional and gender balance is possible, but it is not codified.
• Delays: the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) is still not finalised, so files can stall at either end.

Reforms to improve transparency

• Published criteria: seniority, merit (judgments authored), integrity and diversity, each given a stated weight in the MoP.
• Reasoned resolutions: upload the reasons for every selection and supersession, consistently.
• Permanent secretariat: maintain a database of eligible judges and advocates, with their performance records.
• Time-bound MoP: binding deadlines for both the Collegium and the Centre. The one-week gap between the recommendation (28 September) and the notification (5 October 2026) shows this is feasible [3].
• Advance recommendations: retirement at 65 is known years ahead, so names can be sent before a seat falls empty.

Safeguards for judicial independence

• Judicial primacy retained: the executive can object only in writing and with reasons. If the Collegium reiterates a name, that decision is binding.
• Consultative, not decisive, lay input: borrow from the UK's selection commission, which mixes judges and lay members [1], but give lay members an advisory role only.
• Calibrated confidentiality: publish outcomes and reasons while keeping candidate-specific deliberations private, so reputations are protected.

Transparency and independence are complementary, not competing, goals. A codified MoP, a secretariat and reasoned, time-bound decisions would turn judicial primacy into public trust without letting the executive dominate. This upholds independence as part of the basic structure and meets SDG 16's call for accountable and transparent institutions.