Compare constitutional safeguards for judicial independence in India and Sri Lanka.

Judicial independence rests on how far appointment, tenure, salary and removal are insulated from the executive. India secures this through Articles 124–125 and 217 read with the basic structure doctrine; Sri Lanka declares it in Article 111C and Article 107. Sri Lanka's 22nd Amendment Bill, raising judges' retirement ages, makes the comparison topical.

Common ground

• Both constitutions fix judicial tenure, salary and removal in the text itself rather than by ordinary law — Articles 124, 125 and 217 in India [1]; Article 107 in Sri Lanka [3].
• Removal in both is by presidential order following a parliamentary address on proved misbehaviour or incapacity — Article 124(4) [1] and Article 107(2)-(3) [3].
• Both prescribe fixed retirement ages — Supreme Court 65 and High Court 62 in India [1]; Supreme Court 65 and Court of Appeal 63 in Sri Lanka [3].

Where India's safeguards run deeper

• Appointments: the collegium gives the judiciary primacy; the Supreme Court struck down the 99th Amendment and the NJAC in 2015 for diluting it [2]. In Sri Lanka the President appoints, subject only to Constitutional Council approval [3].
• Amendment control: India's basic structure doctrine lets courts invalidate any amendment eroding independence [2]. Sri Lanka's protection is procedural — entrenched provisions such as Article 3 require a referendum under Article 83 [3], a political rather than judicial check.
• Financial and deliberative insulation: judges' salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund and their conduct cannot be discussed in Parliament except on a removal motion (Article 121) [1].

The Sri Lankan lesson for India

• Extending retirement ages of sitting judges through an executive-sponsored amendment [4] risks the perception that tenure is a benefit conferred by the government.
• India's parallel pressure is real — over four crore pending cases and 35–40% High Court vacancies annually [5] — but the answer lies in timely appointments, not tenure bargains.

Both systems protect judges after appointment; India additionally protects the rules of protection through judicial review, while Sri Lanka leans on referendum entrenchment. Strengthening transparent, time-bound appointment processes in both would align judicial independence with the constitutional promise of separation of powers.