"Compulsory licensing under the Patents Act, 1970 remains a remedy more theoretical than practical." Critically examine this statement in light of recent judicial interventions on patented cancer drug pricing.
Section 84 of the Patents Act, 1970 permits a compulsory licence (CL) three years after grant if public requirements are unmet, the price is not reasonably affordable, or the patent is not worked in India [1]. Yet India has granted only one CL in five decades — a gap the Kerala High Court's Ribociclib proceedings expose sharply.
Why the remedy appears largely theoretical
- Locus standi gap: only an interested party — in practice a willing generic manufacturer — can apply. A patient cannot trigger Section 84 directly, which is why the Kerala HC's suo motu case In Re Exorbitant Pricing of Life Saving Patented Medicines has run for years without a CL applicant for Ribociclib (Novartis) [3].
- Solitary precedent: the Controller's 2012 order for Natco v. Bayer (Sorafenib/Nexavar) cut monthly cost from about ₹2.8 lakh to ₹8,880 — but no CL has followed since [2].
- Executive caution: DPIIT was merely directed to consider the representation; no licence was issued, reflecting sensitivity to trade pressure and investment signalling [3].
- Evidentiary weakness: patchy Form 27 working statements make non-working and unaffordability hard to prove.
Where it retains practical force
- Deterrent value: the Natco outcome, upheld on appeal, created a bargaining shadow encouraging voluntary licences and tiered pricing [2].
- Reserve powers intact: Section 92 government-use in extreme urgency remains available, and TRIPS as read with the Doha Declaration (2001) protects this flexibility [4][1].
- Judicial persistence: converting a deceased petitioner's plea into suo motu proceedings, impleading a new patient, and seeking expert opinion on Palbociclib substitutability keep systemic scrutiny alive [3].
- Parallel routes deliver: DPCO, 2013 ceiling prices under NPPA [5] and PM-JAY helped cut out-of-pocket expenditure from 62.6% to 39.4% between 2014-15 and 2021-22 [6].
The statement holds in practice, not in law: the power exists but lacks an activating agent. Time-bound DPIIT disposal, credible Form 27 enforcement, price negotiation and patent pools for oncology drugs can convert Section 84 from a dormant deterrent into a working guarantee of the Article 21 right to health, advancing SDG-3.
Sources
- 1The Patents Act, 1970 — India Code, Ministry of Law and JusticeSection 84 grounds for compulsory licence; Section 92 government use in circumstances of extreme urgency
- 2Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (IP India)Compulsory Licence Application No. 1 of 2011, *Natco Pharma v. Bayer* (9 March 2012), India's only granted CL and the resulting price reduction
- 3"HC allows cancer patient to join plea on medicine prices" — The Hindu, 24 August 2026Kerala HC suo motu case on Ribociclib pricing, impleadment of a new patient, DPIIT directed to consider CL representation
- 4Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha, 2001) — WTOinternational affirmation of compulsory licensing flexibility for public health
- 5Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 2013 — National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authorityceiling-price regulation as a parallel affordability instrument
- 6National Health Accounts Estimates for India — Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Health and Family Welfaredecline in out-of-pocket expenditure from 62.6% (2014-15) to 39.4% (2021-22)
Practice
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