Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan have often outlasted political hostility but fallen short of transforming the relationship. Critically examine with reference to the Agreement on Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, 1988.

Q. Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan have often outlasted political hostility but fallen short of transforming the relationship. Critically examine with reference to the Agreement on Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, 1988. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

CBMs are mechanisms that reduce the risk of miscalculation without resolving underlying disputes. The Agreement on Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Installations and Facilities — signed on 31 December 1988 and in force from 27 January 1991 [1] — captures both the endurance and the ceiling of India–Pakistan CBMs.

Evidence of resilience - Uninterrupted implementation: lists of nuclear installations are exchanged every 1 January; the 2026 exchange was the 35th consecutive one since 1992, conducted simultaneously through diplomatic channels in New Delhi and Islamabad [1]. - Survived every rupture: Kargil (1999), the 2001–02 standoff, Pulwama–Balakot (2019) and the 2025 hostilities did not suspend it — proof that sub-political institutional channels can outlive political breakdown. - Replicated in other domains: under the Consular Access Agreement, 2008, prisoner and fishermen lists are exchanged on 1 January and 1 July [2], resting on the bilateral framework laid by the Simla Agreement, 1972 [3].

Why transformation has not followed - Declaratory, not verifiable: lists are self-reported, with no independent inspection or dispute-settlement machinery; both states remain outside the NPT, so no external enforcement backstops the pact. - Narrow scope: it bars attacks on facilities only — not arsenals, doctrines, missile behaviour or cross-border terrorism. - Ritualised practice: the exchange has become procedural rather than a springboard to dialogue; the India–Pakistan Joint Judicial Committee on prisoners has been largely inactive, and fishermen often remain jailed after completing sentences [2]. - Core disputes untouched: CBMs manage risk; they do not address the political questions that generate it.

The 1988 Agreement is therefore best judged a floor, not a bridge — it prevents the worst without building trust. The way forward lies in upgrading from risk-avoidance to risk-reduction: reviving the Joint Judicial Committee, humane and time-bound repatriation of fishermen, and resolving the Sir Creek maritime boundary. Deepening these functional channels, in the Simla spirit of bilateralism, remains the most realistic path from coexistence to cooperation.

(~315 words)

Sources: 1. India, Pakistan exchange list of nuclear installations under agreement — NewsOnAir (Prasar Bharati), 1 January 2026 — signing (1988) and entry-into-force (1991) dates; 35th consecutive exchange on 1 January 2026; simultaneous diplomatic-channel exchange 2. Ministry of External Affairs, Press Releases — "Exchange of list of prisoners between India and Pakistan" — prisoner and fishermen list exchange on 1 January and 1 July under the Consular Access Agreement, 2008; pending repatriation of fishermen 3. Simla Agreement, 1972 — Ministry of External Affairs, Legal & Treaties Division — bilateral framework underpinning subsequent India–Pakistan CBMs