"Connectivity is the new currency of geopolitics." Examine how Chabahar and the INSTC shape India's Eurasian outreach, and the constraints they face.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →Today, ports, corridors and transit rights shape a country's influence as much as its military power does. India cannot trade overland through Pakistan. It has therefore built its outreach to Eurasia on two linked routes through Iran: Chabahar port and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
How Chabahar and the INSTC shape India's Eurasian outreach
- Multi-modal reach: INSTC goods move from Mumbai to Shahid Beheshti (Chabahar) by sea, to Bandar-e-Anzali by road, and then across the Caspian to Astrakhan. From there they go on to northern Europe via St. Petersburg [1].
- Legal foothold: India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) signed a 10-year contract on 13 May 2024 to equip and operate the terminal. The government called it an important step in opening the INSTC to Central Asia [2].
- Access to Central Asia: The government presents Chabahar as the way to unlock trade with landlocked Central Asia [3]. India's accession to the Ashgabat Agreement fits with its INSTC plans [4].
- Reaching Afghanistan: India has sent wheat assistance to Afghanistan through Chabahar since 2017 [5]. This showed that India can reach Afghanistan without transit through Pakistan.
- Strategic counterweight: The routes give regional partners an alternative to China's BRI, including CPEC. India opposes CPEC because it passes through PoK.
Constraints
- Sanctions risk: In 2018 the US granted Chabahar an exception from its Iran sanctions under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA). The US revoked that exception from 29 September 2025 [6]. Even before that, the exception was only a letter, not a formal licence, so banks and vendors stayed cautious [6].
- Dependence on one transit state: Both routes pass through Iran [1]. Any conflict involving Iran therefore disrupts both of them at once.
- Russia factor: Western sanctions on Russia make payments and insurance on the northern leg harder.
- Physical gaps: One leg runs by road [1], and inland rail links are unfinished. This adds cargo transfers, cost and delay.
- Regional instability: Uncertainty in Afghanistan, and competition from Gwadar and CPEC, weaken the business case for traders.
Chabahar and the INSTC help India overcome its lack of an overland route to Eurasia and give it a foothold there. However, their value depends on sanctions decisions and on stability in Iran. The way forward is to:
- keep negotiating with the US for a long-term exemption for Chabahar;
- settle more trade in rupees or local currencies;
- speed up the practical use of Ashgabat and the INSTC;
- develop other corridors alongside them.
Diversified connectivity of this kind would protect India's strategic autonomy and support SDG 9 (resilient infrastructure).
Sources
- 1PIB: Workshop conducted on 'Linking Chabahar Port with INSTC'INSTC route, the road leg, and the whole route passing through Iran
- 2PIB: Long-term Main Contract for development of Shahid Beheshti Port Terminal signed between IPGL and PMO Iran10-year contract signed 13 May 2024; step towards opening the INSTC to Central Asia
- 3PIB: India to work towards unlocking trade potential with Central Asia through Chabahar Port: Union Shipping MinisterChabahar as the gateway for trade with Central Asia
- 4PIB: India to accede to the Ashgabat AgreementAshgabat accession fitting with the INSTC
- 5MEA: Flag off of the first consignment of wheat assistance to Afghanistan through Chabahar porthumanitarian wheat to Afghanistan via Chabahar (2017)
- 6ORF: Strategic Continuity: Why India Holds Steady on ChabaharUS revoked the 2018 IFCA exception from 29 Sep 2025; exception was a letter, not a licence, so banks were wary