The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 seeks to remove Ministers detained for 30 days from office. Critically examine its constitutional validity and its potential to decriminalise politics.

Introduced in the Lok Sabha on 20 August 2025, the Bill amends Articles 75, 164 and 239AA to remove a Minister — including the PM or a CM — arrested and detained for 30 consecutive days for an offence punishable with five or more years' imprisonment [1]. It is a bold accountability measure, but its constitutional soundness is contested.

Constitutional validity — the case for

• Article 75(2) already places Ministers at the pleasure of the President; the Bill only codifies an objective trigger rather than creating a new power [1].
• Continues the logic of Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013), which struck down Section 8(4), RPA, 1951, ending protection for convicted legislators [1].
• The 30-day window is defended as ample time to secure bail, preserving natural justice; removal is not permanent disqualification [2].

Constitutional concerns

• Legislative analysis flags tension with four basic structure features — parliamentary democracy, separation of powers, federalism and rule of law [1].
• It shifts the trigger from conviction to mere detention, diluting the presumption of innocence: an accused is not a convict [1].
• Governor-mediated removal of State Ministers risks Centre-State friction, as central agencies control most arrests.
• Accountability to the legislature, not to investigative agencies, is the parliamentary norm; a House retaining confidence in a Minister is overridden.

Potential to decriminalise politics

• Ends "governance from custody", where detained Ministers exercise executive power — a genuine democratic deficit [2].
• Yet it targets the executive, not candidature; criminal antecedents at the nomination stage remain untouched.
• Risk of politically motivated arrests engineered to topple opponents; the Joint Committee is expected to retain the clause with an anti-misuse caveat [3].

The Bill correctly recognises that public trust cannot rest with those in prolonged custody, yet accountability must not become an instrument of instability. Judicially supervised sanction before invoking the clause, time-bound trials for public servants, and fast-track courts for legislators would align it with both rule of law and the constitutional promise of clean, responsible government.