Does the constitutional protection given to the Chief Election Commissioner under Article 324(5) ensure independence, accountability, or both? Discuss.

Article 324(5) says the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) can be removed only "in like manner and on the like grounds" as a Supreme Court judge. It also bars any change to the CEC's service conditions to their disadvantage after appointment [1]. The INDIA bloc's recent symbolic "public impeachment" of CEC Gyanesh Kumar [5] shows the limits of this shield. It secures independence firmly but accountability only thinly.

How Article 324(5) secures independence

• Security of tenure: removal needs Parliament to approve it on proved misbehaviour or incapacity [1]. The executive cannot dismiss a CEC who rules against it.
• Fixed service conditions: salary and terms cannot be cut after appointment, which removes a quiet lever of pressure [1].
• Cover for colleagues: other Election Commissioners (ECs) can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation [1].

Gaps in independence

• Unequal protection: ECs do not have the CEC's shield. The Law Commission's 255th Report recommended equal removal protection for all members [2].
• Entry is unguarded: Art. 324(5) protects how a CEC leaves office, not how one is chosen. The 2023 CEC and ECs Act gives the government a majority on the selection committee [3], and the Supreme Court declined to stay it in 2024 [4].

Gaps in accountability

• All-or-nothing remedy: removal is the only formal sanction. Opposition MPs submitted removal notices in March 2026 [6], but the special-majority threshold makes success unlikely without government support.
• Protest fills the vacuum: the "public impeachment" had no legal effect. Still, it aired voters' complaints of wrongful deletions during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls [5].
• No middle tier: the Commission has no statutory duty to explain contested decisions, such as roll deletions, to Parliament.

Way forward

• Amend the Constitution to give ECs the same protection under Art. 324(5) [2].
• Create a balanced selection panel in the spirit of Anoop Baranwal (2023), in which the Supreme Court said ECs should be chosen by a committee [4].
• Require a report to Parliament on every roll revision, with deletions by reason and State, and a reasoned order before any deletion.

Article 324(5) therefore protects the Commission well against the executive but gives no means of making it answer for its decisions. Transparent appointments and graded accountability through regular reporting would make the Election Commission both fearless and answerable. That would strengthen the free and fair elections that are part of the Constitution's basic structure.