Conviction of senior police officers in corruption cases is rare and often diluted at the appellate stage. Discuss the institutional reasons and suggest reforms for timely closure of corruption trials.

In October 2026 the Kerala High Court suspended the four-year sentence of former DGP Tomin J. Thachankary. The Vigilance Court, Kottayam had convicted him in a disproportionate assets (DA) case [1]. The case shows how a rare conviction can lose its force on appeal. The causes lie in our institutions, not in individual cases.

Institutional reasons

• Conflict of interest in investigation: state vigilance bureaus are largely staffed by police officers. Probing a senior officer of their own cadre creates pressure from the hierarchy.
• Prior-approval filter: under the 2018 amendment, investigators need prior approval before probing a public servant. The Supreme Court has warned that this could reduce investigative efficiency [2].
• Disputable DA arithmetic: a DA case rests on one sum: assets minus known lawful income over a long check period. Disputed "income from other sources" is the very ground of this appeal [1].
• Two legal regimes: offences committed before 26 July 2018 are still tried under the old Section 13(1)(e) [4]. This invites litigation over which law applies.
• Appellate backlog: High Courts hold about 13.8% of pending cases [5]. A fixed four-year term may end before the appeal is heard, so courts routinely suspend the sentence. The conviction survives, but the punishment is deferred.
• Deadlines stop at the trial court: Special Judges must finish trials within two years, extendable to four [2][3]. No such limit applies to appeals.

Reforms for timely closure

• Statutory appeal timeline: set a target for PC Act appeals, modelled on Section 4(4).
• Priority listing: High Courts should create dedicated benches for corruption appeals and list them first once a sentence is suspended.
• Forensic audit before charge-sheet: an independent accountant should check the asset and income calculation, so errors surface early rather than years later on appeal.
• Insulated investigators: give vigilance officers fixed tenure, bring some in on deputation from outside the cadre, and set time limits for approval decisions. This follows the spirit of the Prakash Singh (2006) directives on police accountability.
• Digital asset declarations: annual, verifiable returns would make check-period disputes rarer.

Delay, not leniency, is what weakens corruption convictions against senior officers. If trial deadlines are extended to appeals and investigations are made independent and numerically sound, convictions can be both fair and final. That would serve SDG 16.5 and public trust in the uniformed services.