"Court-monitored investigations by central agencies strengthen accountability but strain cooperative federalism." Critically examine with reference to recent High Court directions.

"Police" is a State subject, and Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946 lets the CBI enter a State only with that State's consent. Constitutional courts can bypass this requirement. The Punjab and Haryana High Court did so recently when it directed a CBI probe into corruption allegations linked to the Punjab CM's office [1]. Orders like this deepen accountability but test federal trust.

Strengthening accountability

• Removes conflict of interest: the State police answer to the executive under suspicion. The HC was "not impressed" with the Punjab Police and sought a "fair and transparent investigation" [1].
• Judicial, not executive, choice: a PIL bench chose the CBI, not the Centre. This weakens the charge of selective targeting [1].
• Time-bound oversight: the CBI must register an FIR "forthwith" and report within two months. The court, not the Union, controls the pace [1].
• Fills the consent gap: once consent is withdrawn, the CBI can act only with case-specific State consent or a Constitutional Court direction [2]. No State will consent to a probe of its own CM's office.

Straining cooperative federalism

• State List intrusion: a central agency is investigating a State's highest executive office.
• Union-controlled chain: the ED (Finance Ministry) raised the allegations [1] and the CBI (DoPT) will investigate. Both answer to the Union, which feeds suspicion in opposition-ruled States.
• Exception becoming routine: eight States, including Punjab (November 2020), have withdrawn general consent [2]. PILs then become the default entry route, which dilutes the CPDR (2010) rule that such transfers be ordered sparingly.
• Litigation replacing dialogue: a Parliamentary Standing Committee found that consent withdrawals hinder investigations. It urged the Union to consult the States concerned [3].

Assessment

• The strain is real. Still, a judicially supervised probe is more neutral than one referred by the executive.
• Its legitimacy depends on the court continuing to monitor the probe, not on picking the CBI alone.

Court-monitored probes repair accountability where State machinery is compromised, but used too often they erode federal trust. The way forward is:

• courts recording clear reasons for each transfer;
• States adopting Prakash Singh (2006) police reforms so their own investigators are credible;
• targeted DSPE amendments for cross-border crimes [3];
• structured Centre–State consultation.

Together these would reconcile the rule of law with cooperative federalism and advance SDG 16's goal of accountable institutions.