Critically analyse the implications of introducing state cost-sharing (60:40/90:10) in a scheme historically funded entirely by the Centre.

Q. Critically analyse the implications of introducing state cost-sharing (60:40/90:10) in a scheme historically funded entirely by the Centre. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The VB-G RAM G Act, 2025, in force from 1 July 2026 [2], replaced MGNREGA's fully Centre-funded unskilled wage component with a 60:40 sharing pattern (90:10 for North-Eastern and Himalayan States) [1]. This converts a purely central entitlement into a co-financed obligation — a shift with both federal gains and real risks to the guarantee itself.

Case for cost-sharing - Larger resource pool: the Central share of ₹95,692.31 crore for FY2026-27, with the matching State share, takes total programme outlay past ₹1.51 lakh crore [4]. - Ownership and accountability: States paying 40% acquire a direct stake in work selection, asset durability and curbing muster-roll leakages. - Predictability: funds now flow through normative State-wise allocations based on parameters in the Rules, aiding fiscal discipline and advance planning [3]. - Federal equity: the 90:10 concession shields fiscally constrained hill and North-Eastern States [1].

Critical concerns - Demand-driven right, supply-constrained purse: the statutory 125-day guarantee and unemployment allowance survive [1][3], but a State unable to release its share can throttle worksite opening — an unfunded mandate in effect. - Counter-cyclical logic weakened: demand peaks in drought or distress-migration years precisely when State revenues contract. - Regressive incidence: poorer States record the highest persondays yet have the weakest own-revenue base, risking widening inter-State divergence. - Perverse incentive: since unemployment allowance is a State liability, co-financing may encourage suppression of work-demand registration. - Normative caps vs. open-ended entitlement: allocation formulae can ration what the law leaves uncapped.

Cost-sharing is defensible as an instrument of cooperative federalism, but its legitimacy rests on the entitlement never becoming budget-contingent. A demand-based contingency window over normative allocations, timely release linked to the State/UT-wise utilisation data already tabled in Parliament [5], and Finance Commission support for low-capacity States would let co-financing deepen accountability without diluting the guarantee — federal partnership serving, not rationing, the right to work.

(~315 words)

Sources: 1. The Viksit Bharat – Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) VB–G RAM G Bill, 2025 — PRS Legislative Research — 60:40 and 90:10 funding pattern; retention of 125-day guarantee and 15-day/unemployment allowance provision 2. VB-G RAM G Act to Come into Force from July 1, 2026 (PIB) — commencement date and repeal of MGNREGA 3. Viksit Bharat – Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin), 2025 (PIB) — statutory 125-day guarantee; normative State-wise allocation under the Rules 4. Federal Contribution of Funds under VB-G RAM G (PIB) — ₹95,692.31 crore Central share for FY2026-27 and total outlay exceeding ₹1.51 lakh crore 5. Allocation of Fund under VB-G RAM G (PIB) — State/UT-wise funds allocated and released, tabled in Parliament