Critically evaluate government discretion in appointment and removal of members of statutory bodies like CBFC.

Statutory bodies derive powers from law, but their members are chosen by executive notification — CBFC members, under Rule 3 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024, hold office "during the pleasure of the Central Government" for up to three years [1]. This discretion enables accountable staffing, yet weakens institutional independence.

The case for executive discretion

• Accountability and expertise: the Minister answers to Parliament for a body exercising statutory power, so appointment must rest with the government; CBFC's Chairperson was appointed by an I&B Ministry notification for a fixed three-year term [3].
• Administrative flexibility: discretion allows quick reconstitution and reform-driven staffing, reflected in CBFC certifying over 70,000 films in five years with cuts confined to statutory violations [7], and in mandating 50% women's participation in every Examining and Revising Committee [8].
• Constitutional propriety: certification limits under Section 5B, Cinematograph Act, 1952 mirror Article 19(2) restrictions [2], a policy domain legitimately guided by the elected executive.

Where the discretion becomes problematic

• No security of tenure: "pleasure" doctrine permits removal without stated grounds or fixed process — members adjudicating a free-speech question serve at the government's will [1].
• No staggering: the entire Board is replaced together, breaking continuity of institutional view across political changes [1].
• Composition without mandate: the Shyam Benegal Committee (2016) urged that the Board act only as a guiding mechanism — annual review, annual report, revision of guidelines — and classify rather than cut [4][5]; the 2024 Rules fix tenure but not this role.
• Rising stakes: with certificates now perpetually valid and UA split into UA 7+/13+/16+ (merely advisory to parents) under the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act, 2023 [6], each Board decision has lasting effect.

Discretion is defensible in selection but indefensible in removal. Codifying fixed tenure with written removal grounds, staggered exits, and the Benegal-recommended review and computerised committee-selection duties [5] would align such bodies with Article 19's promise — making them credible guardians rather than replaceable appointees.