Critically evaluate the institutional architecture of civil aviation safety in India post the Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024.

The Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024, replacing the colonial-era Aircraft Act, 1934, restructured civil aviation governance around three authorities — DGCA (regulation and safety oversight), BCAS (security) and AAIB (accident investigation) [3]. The AI-171 probe offers the first full-scale test of whether this architecture delivers safety in practice.

Strengths of the architecture

• Statutory clarity: the Adhiniyam gives explicit legislative recognition to DGCA, BCAS and AAIB and extends regulation to aircraft design, closing a long-standing gap [3].
• Regulator–investigator separation: AAIB, constituted in 2012 under the Ministry of Civil Aviation, investigates independently of DGCA, meeting ICAO Annex 13's independence standard [1].
• Blame-free safety mandate: AAIB's stated sole purpose is safety enhancement, not attribution of liability, protecting evidentiary candour [1].
• Indigenous technical capacity: black boxes of AI-171 were decoded at the AAIB Lab, Delhi in June 2025, ending dependence on overseas facilities [2].
• Treaty compliance: the Preliminary Report came within Annex 13's 30-day window (12 July 2025) and an Interim Statement on the one-year milestone (12 June 2026) [1][2].

Persisting weaknesses

• Prolonged closure: over a year on, the Final Report awaits international consultation with the States of Design and Manufacture, delaying corrective action [1].
• Capacity and dependence: engine and systems analysis relies on NTSB, Boeing and GE Aerospace, limiting autonomous conclusions [1].
• Transparency deficit: AAIB itself had to rebut "speculative" reporting, reflecting weak structured public communication [4].
• Oversight gaps downstream: the February 2026 grounding of another B787-8 shows recurrence risk persists between investigation and enforcement [5].
• Reform incompleteness: the Adhiniyam largely re-enacts existing structures; DGCA remains an attached office rather than a financially autonomous safety authority.

The Adhiniyam is thus a necessary modernisation of form more than a transformation of capacity. Institutionalising a statutory, adequately staffed AAIB, time-bound reporting, and a State Safety Programme linking findings to enforcement would convert legal clarity into operational safety — advancing both Annex 13 obligations and SDG 9's goal of resilient, safe infrastructure.