·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Critically evaluate non-tariff instruments such as the ALMM in balancing domestic manufacturing with the cost of the energy transition.

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In this answer
  1. Strengths: Building Domestic Manufacturing
  2. Weaknesses: Raising the Cost of Transition
  3. Verdict and Way Forward

The Approved List of Models and Manufacturers (ALMM) is a non-tariff instrument run by MNRE. Only enlisted solar modules qualify for government-linked projects. From June 2026, those modules must also use enlisted cells (List-II) [2]. ALMM has built domestic capacity, but it also raises the cost of reaching 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030 [6]. The real issue is how it is calibrated, not whether it should exist.

Strengths: Building Domestic Manufacturing

  • Assured demand: a protected market helped ALMM-enlisted module capacity cross 100 GW in 2025 [3].
  • Upstream push: List-II (cells) and the extension to ingots and wafers from June 2028 [4] target the stages where import dependence is highest.
  • Quality assurance: enlistment screens out substandard modules from assets meant to run for decades.
  • Energy security: it reduces dependence on a single country's supply chain in a strategic sector.

Weaknesses: Raising the Cost of Transition

  • Supply mismatch: enlisted cell capacity (about 27 GW by early 2026) [4] is a fraction of module capacity [3]. A mandate that runs ahead of supply creates scarcity premiums and delays.
  • Stacked protection: ALMM sits on top of a basic customs duty of 25% on cells and 40% on modules, in force since April 2022 [5]. The higher capital cost passes into tariffs paid by financially stressed DISCOMs.
  • Regulatory uncertainty: the ALMM extension is still under consultation, even as $400 billion in preliminary investment commitments were announced in November 2026 [1]. Shifting rules raise risk premiums and can strand projects planned around imported inputs.
  • Efficiency loss: shielding firms from global competition may slow the adoption of cheaper, newer technologies.

Verdict and Way Forward

  • Capacity-linked phasing: trigger each new list only when verified domestic capacity can meet demand, not on a fixed calendar date.
  • Grandfathering: exempt projects bid before a mandate, as the 2024 amendment did [2].
  • Sunset clauses: tie protection to cost-competitiveness milestones so that the industry outgrows support.
  • Predictability: publish a multi-year roadmap that investors can price in.

On balance, ALMM is a justified tool of strategic industrial policy, but a hasty mandate turns manufacturing gains into transition costs. Calibrated and predictable phasing can reconcile Aatmanirbhar Bharat with affordable clean power. That would help India meet its Panchamrit pledges and SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) together.

Sources

  1. 1India secures $400-billion investment commitments in renewables, The Hindu, 5 Nov 2026 (news)$400 billion preliminary commitments; ALMM extension under consultation
  2. 2PIB: MNRE Announces Significant Amendment to ALMM Order 2019 to Advance Solar ManufacturingList-II for cells from June 2026; exemption for projects bid earlier
  3. 3PIB: India Achieves Historic Milestone of 100 GW Solar PV Module Manufacturing Capacity under ALMM100 GW module capacity
  4. 4PIB: Government Extends ALMM Framework to Solar Ingots and Wafers; To Come into Effect from 1 June 2028ingots/wafers mandate from 2028; List-II cell capacity of about 27 GW
  5. 5IEA Policies Database: Imposition of Basic Custom Duty (BCD) on Solar PV Cells & Modules/Panels25% on cells and 40% on modules from April 2022
  6. 6PIB: Year End Review 2024 of Ministry of New & Renewable Energy500 GW non-fossil target by 2030

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