Critically examine the criteria used to determine 'public authority' status under the RTI Act, 2005, with reference to recent judicial pronouncements.

Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005 defines a public authority as a body established by the Constitution or law, or one "owned, controlled or substantially financed" by government, directly or indirectly [1]. Courts have read this functionally, widening access to bodies spending public money, yet entities living on indirect state largesse largely remain outside.

The criteria as laid down

• Establishment test — created by the Constitution, a legislature, or a government notification/order [1].
• Control test — control must be deep and pervasive, not mere statutory regulation; in Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank v. State of Kerala (2013), cooperative societies under a Registrar's supervision were held not public authorities [2].
• Financing test — in D.A.V. College Trust v. Director of Public Instructions (2019) the Court held "substantial" means of considerable value, not necessarily above 50%; a trust largely run on government grant-in-aid was covered [3].
• Indirect benefit — the CIC's 2013 order treated six national parties as public authorities, citing subsidised land, tax exemption and free airtime [4].

Critical appraisal

• Strength: a substance-over-form test brings NGOs and aided institutions handling public funds within accountability, advancing Article 19(1)(a) [3]; it also shields genuinely private bodies from harassment [2].
• Weakness: "substantially financed" is undefined in the statute, making outcomes case-by-case and litigation-heavy.
• Weakness: non-monetary largesse — concessional land, rent and tax waivers — is treated inconsistently. The political-parties order remains unimplemented [4], while the CIC's 2010 ruling that the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation is not a public authority stood; the 2011 challenge was dismissed only in August 2026 for non-prosecution, leaving the question unsettled on merits [5].
• Weakness: a fifteen-year wait defeats a law built on time-bound disclosure.

The criteria are conceptually sound but under-specified, so their reach depends on litigation rather than rule. Codifying a clear threshold for substantial financing that expressly counts land and tax concessions, mandating proactive disclosure by grant-receiving bodies, and strengthening CIC capacity for quick disposal would align the Act with its own preambular promise of an informed citizenry and with SDG-16 on accountable institutions.