·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Why did early state-led food-processing ventures in India fail? What lessons do they hold for present-day schemes such as PM Formalisation of Micro Food Processing Enterprises (PMFME) and Pradhan Mantri Kisan Sampada Yojana (PMKSY)?

New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →
In this answer
  1. Why early state-led ventures failed
  2. Lessons for PMFME and PMKSY

In 1926, a costly state-funded jam factory in the Madras Presidency was wound up after standing "under padlock" for a long time. Its machinery was split up and its building handed to the Sub-Collector [1]. Such ventures failed less for lack of money than for weak links to raw material, markets and scale. Those same links decide whether PMFME and PMKSY succeed.

Why early state-led ventures failed

  • Output did not match demand: about 7,000 lbs of jam was still unsold when the factory was wound up [1].
  • Slow decisions on idle assets: the plant lay idle for years before any decision, a sign of weak accountability for public money [1].
  • Built too big: Mega Food Parks (2008) needed at least 50 acres, which kept small preservation units out. Only 10 of 42 approved parks were running by March 2018 [2].
  • Weak support system: banks were slow to lend, states were slow to clear roads, power and water, units got no special incentives, and private co-promoters held back their share [2].
  • No chain before the factory: India had 249 pack-houses against a need of 70,080 (2014), and only about 15% of the refrigerated trucks it needed [2]. Fruit rotted before it reached any plant.

Lessons for PMFME and PMKSY

  • Stay small and close to the farm: the Standing Committee on Agriculture asked for agro-processing clusters near production areas [2]. PMFME follows this by supporting existing micro units and self-help groups (SHGs) [4].
  • Markets before machinery: with PMFME's help on credit, branding and marketing, beneficiaries' average turnover rose about 1.7 times. Over 85% of credit-linked subsidy users reported better market links [4].
  • Build the cold chain first: fruit losses are still 6.02–15.05% (NABCONS, 2022), almost the same as in 2015 [3]. PMKSY's cold-chain and Operation Greens components should put pack-houses and refrigerated trucks first.
  • Check results independently: PMFME's gains are self-reported [4]. Third-party audits should measure whether less produce is wasted, not just turnover.
  • Centre–state coordination: time-bound clearances and assured credit can stop parks from stalling [2].

The padlocked jam factory and the stalled mega parks teach the same lesson: a processing unit works only when it is tied into a supply chain and a market. A decentralised, cluster-based, cold-chain-first approach under PMFME and PMKSY, backed by independent checks of results, can cut post-harvest losses and raise farm incomes. That would also advance SDG target 12.3 on reducing food loss.

Sources

  1. 1"Jam Factory's Fate" (100 Years Ago), The Hindu, Chennai1926 padlocked state jam factory wound up, 7,000 lbs of unsold jam, machinery split up, building given to the Sub-Collector
  2. 2Food Processing Infrastructure in India, PRS Legislative Research (2018)Mega Food Park shortfalls, 50-acre rule, Standing Committee findings, pack-house and refrigerated-truck gaps, call for clusters near farms
  3. 3Initiatives to Boost Food Processing and Minimize Loss, PIBfruit post-harvest losses (NABCONS 2022 vs ICAR-CIPHET 2015); PMKSY cold-chain and Operation Greens components
  4. 4Progress and Impact of the PMFME Scheme, PIBmid-term evaluation: about 1.7x turnover, over 85% better market links (self-reported)

More from this note