"Differences should not become disputes" — Analyze this diplomatic framing in the context of India's China policy under the BRICS multilateral platform.

The phrase, reaffirmed by PM Modi and President Xi at their meeting on the margins of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi (September 2026) [4], captures India's post-Galwan approach of compartmentalising an unresolved boundary question from wider engagement. Analysed in parts, the framing rests on three pillars — managing the border, calibrating cooperation, and using multilateral venues — each with distinct achievements and limits.

Component 1: Border management — differences institutionalised

• Rather than a single treaty, India relies on cumulative mechanisms — the WMCC, Special Representatives (SR) talks and Senior Commanders' Meetings, backed by the 1993, 1996 and 2013 BDCA agreements [1].
• The 21 October 2024 patrolling arrangement on Depsang and Demchok enabled disengagement from all 2020 friction points, with patrolling and grazing restored per long-standing practice [2].
• Limit: disengagement is not delimitation. De-escalation and demarcation remain pending, so the "difference" is contained, not settled.

Component 2: Bilateral normalisation — cooperate-yet-compete

• Political-level contact resumed through Kazan (2024) and Tianjin (2025), leading to the "three mutuals" — mutual respect, sensitivity and interest — with peace in border areas as the essential basis of ties [4].
• Persistent frictions — trade imbalance, investment screening, connectivity — mean engagement proceeds alongside India's strategic hedging.

Component 3: BRICS as the multilateral cushion

• Xi's "four points" explicitly routed cooperation through the UN, SCO, BRICS and G-20 [4]; the BRICS New Delhi Declaration (12 September 2026), adopted under India's chairmanship, gave both sides a shared agenda on reformed multilateralism and development finance [3].
• Limit: convergence on global-governance reform does not dilute bilateral asymmetries; BRICS supplies atmosphere, not arbitration.

Reassembled, the framing is best read as risk management rather than resolution — it stabilises a live frontier while preserving space for trade, people-to-people ties and coordinated positions on global reform. Its durability now depends on converting mechanisms into verifiable de-escalation and an eventual boundary settlement. Pursued with strategic patience and continued border infrastructure and diplomatic capacity, it can keep peace and tranquillity — the stated basis of the relationship — from becoming hostage to an unsettled map.