'Differences should not become disputes' — critically analyze this diplomatic doctrine in the context of India-China relations.

Reaffirmed by PM Modi and President Xi at Tianjin on 31 August 2025, the formulation that India and China are "development partners, not rivals" whose differences should not turn into disputes [1] is essentially a doctrine of conflict management. It has stabilised ties after 2020, but stability is not settlement.

Merits: what the doctrine has delivered

• Restored high-level contact — the Kazan meeting on the margins of the 16th BRICS Summit (23 October 2024) ended years of frozen leader-level engagement after the Galwan clash [2].
• Concrete de-escalation — it framed the agreement on complete disengagement resolving issues arising in the border areas since 2020 [2].
• Institutionalised channels — revived the Special Representatives (SR) mechanism to oversee peace and tranquility and seek a "fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution," backed by Foreign Minister-level dialogue [2]; its August 2025 decisions were endorsed by both leaders [1].
• Protects strategic autonomy — by insulating ties from a "third country lens," it preserves India's room for manoeuvre among competing powers [1].
• Widens cooperative space — direct flights, visa facilitation, resumption of the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra, and trade-deficit talks [1].

Limits: why the doctrine is insufficient

• Ambiguity over resolution — disengagement is not delimitation; the boundary question remains unsettled, with only a management mechanism in place [2].
• Asymmetric burden — peace on the border is treated as the precondition for normalisation [1][2], yet the doctrine offers no enforcement if tranquility breaks down again.
• Economic imbalance persists — the acknowledged need to "reduce trade deficit" signals a structural, unresolved dependence [1].
• Deferred, not dissolved, mistrust — differences over connectivity projects, river data and regional alignments remain outside the doctrine's ambit.

Thus the doctrine is a necessary floor, not a ceiling. India should use the SR channel to move from de-escalation toward de-induction and eventual boundary clarification, while diversifying supply chains — converting a tactical calm into durable equilibrium, consistent with the multipolar, autonomy-driven order both leaders invoked [1].