"'Digital arrest' scams exploit fear of the state more than the gullibility of victims." Critically examine, and suggest institutional reforms.

In a "digital arrest" scam, fraudsters pose as CBI, police or ED officers on video calls. They threaten "arrest" and coerce victims into transferring money. Indian law has no such procedure, and no agency investigates by video call [1]. The scam works mainly by borrowing the state's authority, though weaknesses in victims and in the system also help.

Fear of the state: the primary lever

• Borrowed authority: scammers show forged Supreme Court orders and fake CBI/ED identities [3]. The threat works because citizens believe the state can detain people without due process.
• Trust deficit in policing: real experiences of high-handed policing make a sudden "arrest" believable. The Prakash Singh (2006) reform directions remain largely unimplemented.
• Coercive isolation: victims are kept on camera and cut off from family. This is classic intimidation, not a lapse of intelligence.

Where the statement overstates

• Age and digital illiteracy: the Supreme Court's suo motu case began with a senior-citizen couple who lost their savings [3]. Vulnerability matters alongside fear.
• Organised scale: I4C has blocked over 83,668 WhatsApp and 3,962 Skype IDs [2]. This points to syndicates, not just individual credulity.
• Banking leakage: mule accounts let money leave quickly. Only about 26 of 53 banks had adopted MuleHunter.AI [5].
• Awareness does work: digital-arrest complaints on NCRP fell from 1,23,672 (2024) to 58,239 (2025) [6]. So information gaps also played a part.

Institutional reforms

• Police: implement Prakash Singh directions such as Police Complaints Authorities, and publicise D.K. Basu arrest safeguards so citizens know their rights.
• Banks: make MuleHunter.AI universal and tighten KYC at account opening. Banks should call back elderly customers before large, unusual transfers.
• RBI: extend the revised customer-liability framework [7] to coerced, customer-authorised transfers where the bank's due diligence failed.
• Investigation: consolidate the SC-designated CBI lead role and the freezing of traceable funds [4]. Institutionalise platform-level blocking with telecom companies and apps [2].
• Awareness: keep the 1930 helpline and cybercrime.gov.in message ("Ruko, Socho, Action Lo") [1], but deliver it at the moment of payment.

Overall, the scam exploits fear of state power most of all, but vulnerability and weak financial controls make it worse. The lasting fix is a citizen-friendly, rule-bound police backed by accountable banks. That would uphold Article 21's promise of liberty and due process, and protect citizens' trust in digital finance.