Discuss the adequacy of the in-house procedure and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 for ensuring judicial accountability, with reference to recent controversies.

India holds judges accountable in two ways. The first is the Supreme Court's own in-house procedure (1999), a rule the judges made for themselves. The second is removal under Art. 124(4) read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The Justice Yashwant Varma cash episode tested both. It showed that they are needed, but they are not enough.

Strengths of the present framework

• Protects independence: other judges, not the executive, make the first inquiry. This fits judicial independence as part of the basic structure.
• Quick first response: the Delhi HC Chief Justice held a preliminary enquiry into Justice Varma [1]. The CJI then set up a three-judge committee and took away the judge's judicial work [3].
• Rare openness: the enquiry material in the Varma case was made public [3].
• Fair process by law: a motion needs 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha MPs. A three-member committee then frames charges and hears the judge's defence [4]. The Varma committee reported to the Speaker in May 2026 [5].

Gaps in adequacy

• No legal basis: the in-house procedure is not in any law. It can only advise resignation or withdraw work, and it cannot impose a binding penalty.
• Closed and self-policing: the person who complains has no role, and reports usually stay secret. The 2019 in-house report on allegations against then-CJI Ranjan Gogoi was never published.
• All-or-nothing removal: removal needs "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" and special majorities in both Houses [4]. There are no smaller penalties. No judge has ever been removed. The motion against V. Ramaswami failed (1993), and Justice Soumitra Sen resigned (2011) before the process ended.
• Slow and political: the Varma committee took about nine months [5], and every motion depends on MPs being mobilised.
• Weak prevention: judges do not have to declare their assets by law [2].

Way forward

• Pass a law requiring every judge to file annual property returns, as the Parliamentary Standing Committee (2023) recommended [2].
• Put the in-house procedure into law, with deadlines, published outcomes and graded penalties. The lapsed Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 can serve as a model, with the oversight body kept judiciary-led.

Together, the two mechanisms protect independence. But they leave a wide gap between informal pressure from fellow judges and an impeachment that almost never succeeds. A codified, time-bound and transparent system of graded penalties, with judicial primacy intact, would respect the NJAC verdict and strengthen public trust in the courts.