Discuss the constitutional propriety of legislative measures that seek to override specific Supreme Court judgments. Examine this with reference to the CAPF (General Administration) Act, 2026.

A legislature cannot simply declare a judgment void, but it may retrospectively cure the defect the Court identified — the settled distinction between a permissible "validating law" and an impermissible legislative overruling. The CAPF (General Administration) Act, 2026, now under Supreme Court scrutiny, tests exactly this line.

Where legislative override is constitutionally proper

• Parliament may re-legislate within its competence by removing the basis of a judgment; it cannot direct that a decree stands nullified.
• The change must be general in effect, not aimed at defeating vested rights of the specific litigants who won.
• It must independently survive Articles 14, 16 and 21; curing a defect does not immunise the new law from fresh judicial review.

The CAPF Act, 2026 — the controversy

• In Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India (2025), the Court recognised CAPFs as an Organised Group 'A' Service and directed phased reduction of IPS deputation posts within two years [1].
• The 2026 Act, passed by Parliament on 2 April 2026, instead fixes IPS quotas — 50% of IG posts, at least 67% of Additional DG posts, and all Special DG and DG posts across CRPF, BSF, CISF, ITBP and SSB [2].
• Section 3 empowers rule-making "notwithstanding any judgement or order of any Court", and Section 4 lets the executive extend the Act to other forces by notification — a delegated-legislation concern [2].
• Roughly 3,000 cadre officers have challenged both sections as ultra vires; the Court has issued notice to the Union, but has returned no verdict yet [1].

Assessment The Act's difficulty is that it does not appear to cure any defect the Court found; it restates the very arrangement the judgment curtailed, while the phrase "notwithstanding any judgement" strains the separation of powers.

The healthier path is legislative dialogue rather than reversal: Parliament may legitimately assert policy on internal-security command structures, but should do so by demonstrating the functional necessity of IPS leadership and simultaneously guaranteeing cadre officers a fair promotional ladder. Reconciling operational needs with Article 16 equality — and with judicial finality under Article 141 — would preserve both force morale and constitutional comity.