Discuss the federal and accountability dimensions of giving majority control of public training institutions to private anchor partners.

Under PM-SETU, each upgraded ITI cluster is run by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). In it the Anchor Industry Partner (AIP) holds 51%, and the Centre and the State hold 24.5% each [1]. The October 2026 agreements give AM/NS India control of nine Government ITIs in Surat and Visakhapatnam (₹440 crore) [1]. They test what this change means for federalism and for public accountability.

Federal dimension

• Three-party cooperative federalism: The Centre and the State hold equal shares, so States become co-owners, not just implementers [1].
• States choose the partners: Karnataka, Gujarat, Assam and Chandigarh issued their own EOIs [2]. Andhra Pradesh became the first State to onboard an AIP [3], which shows competitive federalism.
• Regional imbalance (concern): Anchors come forward where industry already exists. Funds flow only after an SPV is formed [4], so ITIs in backward districts with no partner may get nothing.
• States keep the heaviest job (concern): Hiring instructors is still a State task, yet one State had filled only 29.79% of sanctioned posts [5]. A 24.5% share means little without teachers.

Accountability dimension

• Real ownership (gain): In the 2007 PPP scheme, industry only led Institute Management Committees that received ₹2.5-crore interest-free loans [6]. A 51% owner that needs the workers has a stronger reason to keep training useful.
• Funds tied to the SPV (gain): This avoids idle money. At an ITI in Tinsukia, the CAG found ₹250 lakh released in 2008 still unused in 2015 [7].
• Answerable to a board, not voters (risk): Public land and staff come under a private firm. The public terms do not yet show safeguards on fees, admissions or partner exit.
• Skills for one employer (risk): A steel company may train mainly for its own plants. Students then gain skills that few other employers value.
• No baseline to audit (risk): NITI Aayog found that many States had no placement data. Only about 10.5 lakh of 25 lakh seats were filled [5].

Majority private control can make ITIs demand-driven, but only if public safeguards come with it. The National Steering Committee, which approves every investment plan [3], should require every Shareholders' Agreement to include fee caps, open admissions, trades useful beyond one employer, exit clauses and a Centre–State veto on core matters. DGT should publish placement baselines, and States should fill instructor posts. PM-SETU can then become a model of accountable cooperative federalism that advances SDG 4 and SDG 8.