Discuss the implications of a legislative supermajority for constitutional stability and checks on executive power, using a comparative example.

A two-thirds legislative supermajority is designed as a consensus threshold — it makes constitutional change hard unless several parties agree. When a single ruling party crosses it alone, the safeguard converts into an instrument, as Russia's September 2026 State Duma election illustrates, with United Russia winning 355 of 450 seats [1].

How supermajorities can aid stability

• They permit decisive correction of constitutional defects without permanent deadlock, giving legal certainty in transitions or emergencies.
• The higher threshold normally compels cross-party bargaining, so amendments carry wider legitimacy than ordinary laws.
• In India, Article 368's special-majority route has enabled structural reforms such as those effected through successive amendment Acts, keeping the Constitution a living document [3].

Risks to checks on executive power — the Russian case

• United Russia's tally crosses the 300-seat constitutional threshold, allowing constitutional amendments without any other party's consent [1].
• The precedent is not theoretical: the Venice Commission found the 2020 amendments (including on Articles 79 and 125) were prepared at a speed "clearly inappropriate" to their societal impact [2].
• Legitimacy is weakened where no party critical of the Kremlin or the war contested, and where turnout and vote share come only from state electoral machinery [1].
• Note the arithmetic honestly: 57.83% of the party-list vote became ~79% of seats largely through single-member district sweeps [1] — seat inflation is partly the electoral system's doing, not proof of manipulation alone.

India's comparative counterweights

• Basic structure doctrine — Parliament may amend any provision but cannot alter the Constitution's essential framework, a judicially enforced ceiling on numerical strength [3].
• Federal ratification under Article 368 for entrenched matters, plus bicameral consent and judicial review [3].

Thus a supermajority is neither inherently stabilising nor destabilising; its effect depends on the surrounding architecture of review. Strong judicial scrutiny, federal ratification and a genuinely competitive ballot convert numbers into legitimate reform rather than unchecked executive consolidation — the safeguard India's constitutional design consciously embeds.