Discuss how India balances strategic interests against democratic values in its engagement with Myanmar.

Myanmar is the only ASEAN country that shares both a land border (1,643 km) and a maritime boundary (1,098 km) with India [2]. Since the 2021 coup, India has followed pragmatic engagement. It works with whoever governs Naypyidaw and pushes quietly for a return to democracy.

Strategic interests driving engagement

• Act East gateway: Myanmar links India's Northeast to Southeast Asia. The Kaladan project and Sittwe Port, which had berthed over 301 vessels by May 2026, depend on it [2].
• Maritime security: IMNEX-26 at Visakhapatnam follows the MAHASAGAR vision and builds naval interoperability in the Bay of Bengal [1].
• Border management: Army, Air Force and Naval Staff Talks and MoUs on border and maritime cooperation support security on a porous frontier [2].
• Keeping diplomatic presence: the PM met Sr Gen Min Aung Hlaing at BIMSTEC (Bangkok) and at SCO Tianjin in 2025, so India keeps a voice in a contested neighbourhood [2].

Democratic values under strain

• Legitimacy: drills and high-level visits with a military-led government risk legitimising it.
• Human-rights record: a UN Special Rapporteur found that India-based entities supplied US$51 million of arms and related material to the military after February 2021 [3].
• Ground reality: the Arakan Army holds 14 of Rakhine's 17 townships [4]. Sittwe is in Rakhine, so ties with the military government alone cannot secure Kaladan.

How India strikes the balance

• Humanitarian diplomacy: under Operation Brahma (2025), India sent warships and aircraft with earthquake relief. This built goodwill among ordinary people, not only with the regime [2].
• People-centred aid: India's development portfolio is about US$1.5 billion, nearly US$1 billion of it grants. It funds schools, health centres and village electrification [2].
• Nudging the political process: in their meeting, the PM and the Senior General discussed "the elections in Myanmar" [2].
• Gaps: the tactical manoeuvres in IMNEX's Sea Phase go beyond disaster relief [1]. India also has no public rule for screening defence supplies to Myanmar.

India's Myanmar policy is calibrated realism: strategic necessity decides that India must engage, while democratic values shape how it does so. Going forward, India should give naval drills a stronger HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) focus and publish a screening rule for defence supplies. It should also engage all stakeholders, including ethnic armed groups, to keep connectivity projects moving. Supporting an inclusive transition fits Neighbourhood First and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), and it is also the surest way to protect India's strategic interests.