Discuss the need for a statutory and autonomous framework for the CBI in light of recurring Centre–State conflicts over Central investigative agencies.

The CBI is India's premier investigative agency. It was created by an executive resolution in 1963 and draws its powers from the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946 [1]. Its weak legal footing and its dependence on the Union executive have made it a repeated source of Centre–State conflict.

Recurring Centre–State conflicts

• Consent wars: Section 6 of the DSPE Act requires State consent [1]. Several States, Punjab among them, withdrew general consent. A parliamentary committee found that this has hindered investigations [2].
• Judicial bypass: Constitutional courts can order CBI probes without State consent [3]. In October 2026, the Punjab and Haryana High Court ordered a CBI probe linked to the CM's office. Punjab calls this a violation of federalism [4].
• Trust deficit: States allege that the agency is used against them close to elections. Punjab cites its poll-bound status [4].

Why a statutory framework

• Clear rules: A dedicated law could set out the CBI's jurisdiction, when consent is needed and objective triggers for Central entry. This would replace the vague "sparingly, in exceptional situations" test [3].
• Fewer court battles: Predictable rules would reduce case-by-case litigation, which delays the probes themselves [4].
• Sector-specific consent: The Home Affairs Committee has suggested amending the DSPE Act so that the CBI can probe cybercrime without consent [2].

Why autonomy

• Insulation: The CBI is administered by DoPT [1]. The perception that the Union controls it fuels State suspicion.
• Institutional anchoring: A Parliamentary Standing Committee (2015) recommended placing the Lokpal at the apex, with the CVC and the CBI's anti-corruption wing under its control [5].
• Credibility on both sides: An independent agency would answer the States' fear of misuse. It would also meet the courts' concern that State police cannot probe their own leaders, a concern the High Court raised about the Punjab Police [4].

Caveats

• "Police" is a State subject, so reform must come through consultation with States, not a unilateral override.
• Autonomy needs accountability: transparent appointments and parliamentary oversight.

These recurring conflicts show that the CBI's crisis is about legal ambiguity and trust, not just consent. A CBI Act should define the agency's jurisdiction, guarantee its functional autonomy and link its anti-corruption work to the Lokpal. If it is drafted in consultation with States, it would make investigations credible while respecting cooperative federalism and SDG 16's call for accountable institutions.