Discuss how privacy-by-design features in Digital Public Infrastructure can build trust among citizens, with reference to recent Aadhaar initiatives.

Privacy-by-design means data protection is built into a system as the default setting, not added later [1]. Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) such as Aadhaar is used by almost every citizen, so this design is what earns their trust. UIDAI's Aadhaar App (January 2026) and its 300 Offline Verification Seeking Entities (OVSEs) show both what this can achieve and where it falls short [2].

How privacy-by-design builds trust: Aadhaar examples

• Data minimisation: offline QR verification needs no live check against UIDAI's central database, so no central record exists of who was verified, where [2].
• No storage: the 2019 Amendment created offline verification without authentication. Verifying agencies may not store the Aadhaar number or biometrics [3].
• Safer than photocopies: UIDAI asks entities to scan the QR code instead of collecting copies that carry the full number [4].
• User control: residents can switch on biometric and Aadhaar locks if they choose. 4.6 crore biometric lock/unlock transactions show strong demand for this control [2].
• Consent and accountability: entities need explicit consent, must keep consent records for audit and mask stored numbers. They must report misuse within 72 hours [4].
• Inclusion: under the non-denial rule, no service can be refused to a resident who can prove identity another way [4]. QR checks also avoid fingerprint failures, which CAG found ran as high as 49% in some states [5].
• Economic trust: paperless onboarding helps hotels, healthcare and the gig economy. OVSEs rose from 100 (April 2026) to 300 [6][2].

Limits that can erode trust

• Hidden from the regulator: an offline check leaves UIDAI no log. The OVSE holds the only consent record, so the entity being checked also holds the evidence [4].
• Weak past enforcement: CAG Report No. 24 of 2021 found UIDAI had received no audit reports from its partners and had not checked their systems before letting them in [5].
• Opt-in, not default: residents must switch the locks on themselves, which falls short of the ID4D standard of "privacy by default" [1].
• No outcome data: nothing is published on refusals, failed checks or misuse reports [2].
• Digital divide: the App needs a smartphone [2].

Privacy-by-design turns Aadhaar from a system that collects data into one that proves identity without exposing it, and that is the basis of citizen trust. To make it work, UIDAI should check OVSEs before onboarding them, audit samples of their consent logs every year, publish outcome data and make privacy the default. Done this way, Aadhaar can uphold the right to privacy under Article 21 and advance SDG 16.9 (legal identity for all).