[Discuss the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee and Shekatkar Committee in the context of India's ongoing military reforms. (GS-III, 10 marks)](/upsc-mains-answer/discuss-recommendations-kargil-review-committee-shekatkar-170dfe1)

The Kargil Review Committee (1999) under K. Subrahmanyam and the Shekatkar Committee (2016) under Lt Gen (Retd) D.B. Shekatkar are the two institutional pillars of India's post-Kargil defence restructuring — the first addressing higher defence organisation, the second combat efficiency and expenditure rebalancing. Together they frame the theatre-isation debate now before the government.

Kargil Review Committee (1999): fixing the apex structure

• Recommended a comprehensive review of the national security framework for better decision-making on defence matters [1].
• Sought reorganisation of the interface between the Defence Ministry and Service Headquarters, whose gaps surfaced during the Kargil conflict [1].
• Its report led the Group of Ministers (2001) to propose a Chief of Defence Staff, realised when the Cabinet approved the four-star post in 2019 [2], with the Department of Military Affairs mandated to restructure commands "including through establishment of joint/theatre commands" [2].

Shekatkar Committee (2016): efficiency and rebalancing

• Submitted its report in December 2016 with 99 recommendations to enhance combat capability and rebalance defence expenditure [3].
• Proposed optimisation of signals establishments, restructuring of Army repair echelons and redeployment of ordnance depots — freeing manpower for the operational edge [3].
• Three accepted recommendations on border infrastructure speeded up road construction in border areas, aiding socio-economic development [4].
• Its operational content remains classified in the national interest, limiting public scrutiny [3].

Reform trajectory today

• The Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023 empowers a commander to exercise disciplinary control over personnel of all three services — the legal backbone of jointness [5].
• The Andaman & Nicobar Command, India's only joint-services operational command, serves as the working model for theaterisation [6].

Both committees converge on one insight: capability flows less from numbers than from integration. Sequencing reform — legal enablement first, then doctrinally negotiated theatre commands that respect the Air Force's need for flexible employment of limited assets — offers the surest path. Realising the Kargil Committee's vision of a genuinely integrated national security architecture remains the unfinished task.