Discuss the role of judicial intervention in making essential medicines affordable in India, with reference to Article 21.
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In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity (1996), the Supreme Court held that Article 21 obliges the State to preserve life and that a lack of funds cannot excuse a failure to provide medical care [1]. Treatment depends on medicines, so the courts have read affordable access to them into this guarantee. They have pushed the executive to control prices but have not taken its place.
Judicial interventions that advanced affordability
- Pressure on policy: The AIDAN PIL (W.P. 423/2003) raised the pricing and availability of essential drugs [2]. It kept the State answerable while pricing policy was being framed.
- Patent jurisprudence: In Novartis v. Union of India (2013), the Court upheld Section 3(d) and refused a patent for Glivec [3]. This blocked "evergreening", where a company extends a patent through minor changes, and kept generic cancer drugs available.
- Extending price control: In October 2026, a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta questioned the steep gaps between supply prices and MRPs. It asked why caps should not cover other medicines [5]. The Centre then committed to a 30% trade-margin cap on anti-cancer drugs [4].
- Results: NPPA capped margins on 137 non-scheduled cancer drugs, with MRP cuts of up to 70% [6]. This builds on the 2019 pilot, which cut the MRPs of 526 brands by up to 90% [6].
Limits of judicial intervention
- Litigation stalls recovery: ₹8,447.4 crore (about 84%) of overcharging dues was still unrecovered in March 2026 [5]. About 70% of it is under litigation, and some cases have been pending for more than 20 years [7].
- Slow and episodic: The AIDAN petition was still listed in 2026, more than two decades after it was filed [8].
- Expertise and separation of powers: Fixing prices needs cost data, and courts are not equipped for that. The Centre itself chose to leave cheap drugs out of the cap [4], and that kind of fine-tuning is best left to the executive.
Way forward
- A parliamentary committee recommended a fast-track mechanism for cases not yet in court, a legal cell in NPPA, and a permanent trade-margin framework in DPCO 2013 [7].
- Courts should step in mainly where the executive fails to act, while NPPA takes on day-to-day enforcement.
The judiciary has made Article 21 a working tool for cheaper medicines through constitutional interpretation, patent rulings and pressure on price regulation. Lasting affordability, however, needs a stronger NPPA and a legal framework for trade margins, so that courts guard the right without setting prices. This would advance SDG 3.8 on universal health coverage and the dignity that Article 21 promises.
Sources
- 1Supreme Court of India: *Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal* (1996) judgment: Article 21 requires the State to provide medical care regardless of financial constraints
- 2Lok Sabha answer on the AIDAN writ petition (W.P. 423/2003), Parliament Digital Library: PIL on the availability and pricing of essential drugs
- 3UNCTAD IP Case Law: *Novartis AG v. Union of India & Others* (Supreme Court, 1 April 2013): Section 3(d) upheld, Glivec patent refused
- 4All India Radio NewsOnAir: Centre decides to cap cancer drug margins at 30% (12 October 2026): Centre's 30% cap commitment; inexpensive drugs left out
- 5The Hindu: Drug prices: overcharging claims of ₹8,447 crore remain unpaid (22 October 2026): ₹8,447.4 crore unrecovered; the Bench's question on extending caps
- 6All India Radio NewsOnAir: NPPA undertakes trade margin rationalisation for 137 non-scheduled anti-cancer drugs (17 October 2026): 137 drugs, cuts of up to 70%; 2019 pilot covering 526 brands
- 7PRS Legislative Research: Standing Committee report summary, Review of the role, functions and duties of NPPA: 70% of dues in litigation; fast-track mechanism, legal cell and permanent trade-margin framework
- 8Supreme Court of India: cause list, 15 January 2026: AIDAN petition W.P. 423/2003 still listed