Discuss the significance of a BRICS cross-border payments mechanism for reducing dollar dependence in intra-bloc trade. What challenges does India face in operationalising this as BRICS chair?
Payments between BRICS members are still routed through correspondent banks in a dominant third currency, mainly the US dollar. With intra-BRICS merchandise exports at about USD 1.17 trillion in 2024, over thirteen times the 2003 level [2], a dedicated settlement mechanism has moved from rhetoric to a working agenda under India's 2026 chairship [1].
Significance for reducing dollar dependence
- Lower cost and faster settlement: direct national-currency settlement strips out intermediary banks, conversion spreads and fees. The 1st BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Meeting (12 August 2026) released a Technical Report on a BRICS Cross-Border Payments System for cheaper, safer, more transparent payments [1].
- Resilience: reduced exposure to dollar-liquidity squeezes and to the disruption of correspondent channels by sanctions.
- Rupee internationalisation: scale for INR trade settlement and Special Rupee Vostro Accounts, a stated RBI objective [3].
- Technology, not a new currency: interlinking fast payment systems and CBDCs such as the e₹ [4] delivers interoperability without a single BRICS currency — the logic BIS Project Nexus, in which India participates, already demonstrates [5].
Challenges before India
- Asymmetry within the bloc: China's economic weight risks replacing dollar dependence with renminbi dependence, unhelpful given India's large trade deficit with China.
- Currency convertibility: the RBI's Inter-Departmental Group flagged shallow INR markets and limited convertibility [3]; persistent bilateral surpluses leave partners holding unusable balances.
- Strategic balancing: India must avoid signalling a de-dollarisation bloc that invites tariff or secondary-sanction pressure from Western partners.
- Institutional heterogeneity: ten members with divergent AML/KYC rules, data-localisation norms and uneven CBDC maturity, in a consensus body with no binding enforcement.
The mechanism is best read not as an assault on the dollar but as de-risking — adding a parallel rail for trade that is already large. India should therefore push incremental, standards-based interoperability with strong safeguards, converting its chairship into a durable Global South public good consistent with its own strategic autonomy.
Sources
- 1BRICS India 2026 official website (Chairship, 18th Summit, FMCBG outcomes)India's 2026 chairship; 1st FMCBG meeting of 12 August 2026 and the Technical Report on a BRICS Cross-Border Payments System
- 2UNCTAD, *Two Decades of Intra-BRICS Trade: Trends, Patterns and Policies* (2025)intra-BRICS exports of about USD 1.17 trillion in 2024, a thirteen-fold rise since 2003
- 3RBI, *Report of the Inter-Departmental Group on Internationalisation of INR*rupee internationalisation objective; convertibility and market-depth constraints
- 4RBI, *Digital Rupee (e₹) – FAQs*India's CBDC, issued by the RBI in retail and wholesale form
- 5BIS, *Project Nexus: enabling instant cross-border payments*standardised interlinking of domestic instant payment systems, with India among the participating countries