Discuss the significance of the SCO for India's Central Asia policy in light of INSTC and Chabahar, and the challenge posed by sovereignty-violating connectivity projects.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is the only forum where India sits regularly with Russia and four of the five Central Asian republics [2]. That makes it India's main multilateral link to a landlocked region. At the 25th SCO Council of Heads of Government (Dushanbe, 2026), India backed INSTC and Chabahar. It also warned that connectivity which ignores sovereignty "will not be sustainable" [1].

Significance of the SCO for India's Central Asia policy

• Institutional access: India became a full member in 2017. It pays 5.9% of the SCO budget and holds quota posts in the Secretariat and RATS [2]. This gives India steady contact with Central Asian capitals.
• Support for INSTC and Chabahar: At Tianjin (2025), the PM said India strongly supports Chabahar and INSTC as drivers of trade and trust [3]. Iran joined the SCO in 2023 [2], so the corridor's key country is now inside the group.
• Economic outreach: India backed the PMTEC Action Plan 2026–30 (the SCO's trade and economic cooperation plan). It also held a Mumbai symposium on financing Central Asian infrastructure [1].
• Soft connectivity: India pushed simpler customs, digital documents and interoperable Digital Public Infrastructure [1]. These make the routes cheaper to use, not just build.
• Security: The RATS (the SCO's counter-terrorism body, based in Tashkent) [2] and India's call for "no double standards" on terrorism [4] support the regional stability these corridors need.

Challenge posed by sovereignty-violating connectivity

• CPEC/BRI: CPEC, China's main Belt and Road corridor, runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India therefore insists that connectivity must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity [4][1].
• Consensus limits: The SCO works by consensus [1], and China and Pakistan are both full members [2]. India can block texts it dislikes, but it cannot get its own objection into joint documents.
• Geography: Pakistan does not give India land transit. This leaves India dependent on the Iran route, which is exposed to sanctions.
• Institutional drift: The RM warned that "more institutions" do not mean "more achievements" [1]. This shows India's caution about China-led expansion of the SCO.

The SCO gives India the access to Central Asia that INSTC and Chabahar need, but China–Pakistan connectivity limits what India can achieve there. India should offer trusted connectivity: transparent financing, digital trade facilitation and its planned Civilisational Dialogue Forum [1]. This would keep India's SECURE vision, which includes respect for sovereignty [2], a credible alternative for the region.