Discuss the significance of Supreme Court-constituted high-powered committees in ensuring police accountability during civil protests, with reference to a recent example.

The right to assemble peaceably under Article 19(1)(b), subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(3), is meaningful only if the force used to police it is proportionate [2]. Where statutory oversight is weak, Supreme Court-constituted high-powered committees have emerged as an important corrective, though not a substitute for institutional reform.

Why such committees matter

• Independence from the investigating agency: they place the inquiry outside the police hierarchy that is itself the accused, avoiding the conflict of interest that dilutes internal departmental probes.
• Enforcing proportionality: they test whether force met the minimum-force and proportionality standard that human-rights guidelines require, and whether warning preceded escalation [5].
• Filling an accountability gap: Police Complaints Authorities directed in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006) remain unevenly constituted across States, leaving victims without a functioning forum [3].
• Systemic remedy: unlike an FIR, which fixes individual culpability, committees can recommend structural changes — identifiable nameplates, crowd-control SOPs, weapon protocols — echoing the Second ARC's Fifth Report, "Public Order" [4].

Recent example In August 2026 the Supreme Court constituted a five-member High-Powered Enquiry Committee headed by former Justice R. Subhash Reddy to probe police action against students marching from Jantar Mantar towards Parliament on 20 July 2026 [1]. Its mandate expressly covers pellet guns, electric batons, lathi charge and tear gas used without adequate warning or proportionality, and the wearing of visible nameplates to enable identification of personnel [1].

Limitations

• Recommendatory only; unlike a statutory commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, its follow-through depends on judicial monitoring [6].
• Case-by-case and reactive; it cannot substitute for permanent oversight bodies.
• Risk of duplication with parallel police investigations.

Such committees thus supply credibility where routine mechanisms falter, converting individual grievance into systemic reform. The durable answer, however, lies in operationalising Police Complaints Authorities and codifying use-of-force SOPs, so that accountability becomes routine rather than exceptional — securing both public order and the constitutional freedom to protest.