Discuss the significance of UNCLOS provisions on 'transit passage' in maintaining freedom of navigation through international straits.

Straits used for international navigation lie within the 12-nautical-mile territorial seas of coastal states, yet carry the bulk of world trade. UNCLOS (1982) resolves this tension through Part III's right of transit passage, a regime that is central to keeping chokepoints open in law even when politics turns hostile.

The legal architecture

• Article 37 applies the regime to straits linking one part of the high seas/EEZ to another; Article 38 grants all ships and aircraft — including warships — freedom of navigation and overflight for "continuous and expeditious transit" that "shall not be impeded" [1].
• Article 44 is decisive: strait states "shall not hamper" transit and there shall be no suspension of transit passage — unlike innocent passage in the territorial sea, which may be temporarily suspended [1].

Why it safeguards navigation

• It converts freedom of navigation from a great-power claim into a treaty entitlement, denying littoral states a veto over global trade routes.
• It is balanced, not one-sided: Article 39 obliges ships to proceed without delay and refrain from the threat or use of force, while Article 42 lets strait states legislate on safety, pollution and sea lanes — provided rules are non-discriminatory.
• Article 43 institutionalises burden-sharing between user and coastal states. Its first practical expression was the Cooperative Mechanism (2007) of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which sustains navigational aids and pollution control while keeping the straits "free, open and safe" [2].

Where it strains

• Enforcement depends on state consent. The Strait of Hormuz, carrying about 20 million barrels/day in 2024 (~20% of global petroleum liquids consumption) [3], has seen conflict-driven closure attempts, with Indian-flagged carriers such as the LPG tanker Green Asha transiting amid tensions [4].

Transit passage thus supplies the indispensable legal floor for maritime commerce, but law alone cannot police a chokepoint. The Malacca-Singapore experience suggests the way forward: pairing Article 38's guarantee with Article 43-style cooperative mechanisms among littoral and user states — an approach consistent with India's SAGAR vision of a secure, rules-based and shared maritime order.