An elected government in a Union Territory faces the paradox of a mandate without power. Discuss with reference to Jammu & Kashmir.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 turned the State into a Union Territory (UT) with a legislature, which the President administers through a Lieutenant Governor (LG) [3]. The 2024 Assembly election gave a strong popular mandate, but most of the powers needed to act on it stay with the Centre.
The Mandate
- High participation: turnout was 63.88%, above the 58.58% recorded in J&K in the 2024 Lok Sabha polls [1].
- Clear verdict: the National Conference (NC) won 42 of 90 seats and its ally INC won 6 [2]. This ended years of direct central rule.
The Power Deficit
- Legislative: the Assembly cannot make laws on police and public order, while Parliament can legislate on any subject [3].
- Executive: the Council of Ministers advises the LG only on subjects within the Assembly's domain [3]. The 2024 Business Rules amendments send police, All India Services, the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Advocate General appointments and prosecution sanctions through the LG [4].
- Constitutional limbo: in In Re: Article 370 (2023), the Supreme Court left open whether Article 3 allows a State to be downgraded to a UT. It relied on the Centre's assurance that Statehood would return "as soon as possible". It fixed a deadline for elections but not for Statehood [5].
Consequences
- Accountability gap: in the Delhi services case, the Court held that civil servants answer to ministers, ministers to the legislature, and the legislature to voters [6]. In J&K this "triple chain" breaks, because voters blame the Chief Minister for decisions the LG controls.
- Dual power centres lead to friction and slow decisions. They also risk undoing the democratic re-engagement shown by the turnout.
The Centre's Rationale
- Security: J&K is a border region with a history of militancy, which is why the Centre keeps control of policing.
- Precedent: even Delhi's elected government does not control police and public order [6], so some central role is constitutionally normal.
Way Forward
- Time-bound roadmap to Statehood with named security benchmarks, given legal effect by Parliament amending the 2019 Act.
- Interim steps: clear demarcation of powers in the Business Rules, and a phased transfer of subjects with no security link.
A mandate without power weakens the accountability chain that representative democracy depends on. If the Centre keeps the assurance it gave the Court [5], with calibrated security arrangements, J&K's electoral revival can become lasting federal trust, in line with the cooperative federalism the Constitution envisages.
Sources
- 1PIB/ECI – "Overall, 63.88% turnout recorded in J&K Assembly Elections" (Oct 2024)turnout of 63.88% vs 58.58% in the Lok Sabha polls
- 2Election Commission of India – Party-wise Results, J&K Assembly Election, Oct 2024NC 42, INC 6 of 90 seats
- 3PRS Legislative Research – The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019UT with legislature under the LG; police and public order excluded; Council of Ministers' advisory role
- 4Transaction of Business of the Government of UT of J&K (Second Amendment) Rules, 2024 – G.S.R. 386(E), Gazette of India, 12 July 2024LG's role over police, AIS, ACB, Advocate General and prosecution sanctions
- 5Supreme Court of India – *In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution*, Judgment dated 11 Dec 2023Article 3 question left open; Statehood "as soon as possible"; election deadline
- 6PRS Legislative Research – Legislative Brief, The Government of NCT of Delhi (Amendment) Bill, 2023SC's 2023 "triple chain" of accountability; police and public order with the Centre in Delhi