"The Election Commission's adjudication of intra-party disputes under the Symbols Order has become a de facto substitute for the diluted anti-defection law." Critically examine.

The Tenth Schedule (1985) was meant to stop defections. The 91st Amendment (2003) removed the one-third "split" exception but left the two-thirds merger route open [2]. Since then, factional fights have moved to the Election Commission (EC) under Para 15 of the Symbols Order, 1968. The latest example is the Supreme Court's three-month deadline for the EC to settle the Trinamool dispute [1]. The claim is only partly valid.

How the EC has become a de facto substitute

• The fight has changed forum: A split is no longer protected, so rebels now claim to be the real party instead of leaving it. The EC's award of name and symbol decides who controls the party [2][4].
• Headcount favours rebels: The Sadiq Ali (1971) "test of majority" lets numbers in the legislature dominate. The Shinde faction, backed by about two-thirds of Shiv Sena MLAs, won the name and symbol in February 2023 [4]. The NCP case in 2024 ended the same way.
• Speakers leave a gap: The law sets no time limit for Speakers, and some have delayed petitions for years [3]. The EC's verdict often comes first and settles the political question.
• Courts reinforce the EC's role: The Supreme Court has now set EC deadlines, such as three months in the TMC case [1], which makes the EC the effective arbiter.

Why the substitute is incomplete

• The two processes serve different purposes: The EC decides which faction is the party; the Speaker decides disqualification. In Subhash Desai (2023), the Supreme Court held the two proceedings to be independent. The EC's ruling applies only from its date and cannot settle pending disqualification petitions [6].
• The EC cannot punish: It has no power to unseat a defector. That penalty comes only from the Tenth Schedule.
• The legitimacy problem: The EC counts MLAs whose own defection is still undecided. The test is circular and rewards the very defection the law forbids.
• The root cause lies elsewhere: Party leaders use the law to stamp out dissent [2], so disagreement surfaces as an attempt to capture the whole party.

The EC has become the main arena for party splits, but it is not a true substitute for the anti-defection law. Parliament should act on the Supreme Court's suggestion of an independent tribunal in place of the Speaker, with a three-month limit for disqualification cases [5]. The EC should also weigh the party's constitution and its organisational majority, not just its MLAs, and inner-party democracy should be made mandatory. Together, these steps would restore the Tenth Schedule's aim of stable, principled representation.