The emergence of minilateral groupings such as the Saudi–Türkiye–Pakistan 'Mecca Agreement' reflects a shift towards regionally owned security in West Asia. Examine the implications for India.

For decades, the US guaranteed Gulf security. The February 2026 US–Israel strikes on Iran came while Oman was mediating US–Iran talks. Iran then struck Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states [1]. Together these exposed that model's limits. The "Mecca Agreement" outreach to Tehran shows regional powers now managing risk themselves, with mixed implications for India.

Why the shift

• Hosts as targets: Iran called hostile bases in the region legitimate military objectives [2], so every state hosting US forces became a frontline target.
• Weaker outside guarantees: Great-power force overrode regional mediation, and the UN Secretary-General invoked Article 2(4) of the UN Charter [1].

Implications for India: Opportunities

• De-escalation dividend: India already backs restraint, dialogue and sovereignty [3]. Regional mediation supports its call for free navigation through Hormuz [4].
• Energy security: India imports about 60% of its LPG, and roughly 90% of those imports pass through Hormuz [5]. Any calm protects supply.
• Diaspora: About 1 crore Indians live in GCC countries [4]. Stability protects their lives and their remittances.

Implications for India: Challenges

• Pakistan at the table: India's rival gets a say in Gulf security talks that India is not part of. This could weaken India's Gulf partnerships and its IMEC plans.
• Fragile results: The grouping cannot restrain Washington or Tel Aviv, and the costs are already real:
• A 25–30% LPG shortfall in April forced rationing, with fertiliser plants given priority [6].

• Over 3,75,000 Indians have returned home, and some died in attacks [7].

• Balancing dilemma: Leaning towards any bloc puts India's stakes in Iran (Chabahar), the Gulf monarchies or Israel at risk.

Way forward

• Diplomatic: Openly back regional mediation, in line with India's stated position [3]. At the same time, deepen bilateral ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
• Energy: Do for LPG what was done for crude. About 70% of crude now avoids Hormuz, sourced from around 40 countries [5]. Apply the same method to LPG through long-term contracts and storage, and keep up the domestic LPG output gains made during the crisis [6].
• Institutional: Make the Defence Minister-led Inter-Group of Ministers [8] a standing body for evacuation, shipping and energy emergencies.

Regionally owned security can lower the risk of escalation, but it also changes who sits at the table. India should back dialogue grounded in the UN Charter while reducing its energy and diaspora exposure. That would keep it a stakeholder, not a spectator, in its extended neighbourhood, in line with SDG 16 on peaceful societies.