Evaluate the challenges posed by Unmanned Aerial Systems in counter-terrorism operations and the role of international cooperation in developing counter-UAS capabilities.

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have extended terrorism from ground infiltration into the airspace. The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) calls terrorist use of drones an "evolving and increasingly complex threat" [1]. The threat is serious, and international cooperation is necessary to counter it. It is not enough, though, without national capability.

Challenges posed by UAS in counter-terrorism

• Low cost, easy access: drones are sold commercially, and advances in AI and modular design have made them easier to acquire and adapt [1].
• Cross-border logistics: 28 drones carrying arms and narcotics were recovered on the Punjab border in the three years up to February 2023 [2].
• Attacks on vital installations: the Jammu Air Force Station drone attack, investigated by the NIA [3], showed that small drones can get past perimeter security.
• Saturation attacks: on 7–8 May 2025, drones and missiles targeted military sites across northern and western India. They were neutralised by an Integrated Counter-UAS Grid [4].
• Regulatory lag: technology is changing faster than laws and institutions can adapt, and regulation is fragmented across countries [1].

Role of international cooperation

Strengths

• Setting norms: the Delhi Declaration (CTC special meeting in India, October 2022) made UAS a priority [5]. The Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles now give states practical guidance [1].
• Joint training: KAZIND-2026 with Kazakhstan integrates UAS and Counter-UAS, supported by a Joint Command Post and an Intelligence and Surveillance Centre [6].
• Intelligence sharing: there is a bilateral JWG on Counter-Terrorism and cooperation through SCO-RATS [7].

Limitations

• The guidance is non-binding. Implementation is held back by gaps in national capacity and weak involvement of the private sector [1].
• Joint exercises build interoperability, not hardware. In practice, India relied on the indigenous Akashteer air-defence network [4].

Verdict

Drones multiply terrorists' reach, and cooperation mainly supplies norms, intelligence and practised drills. The detection and interception capability itself has to be built at home.

UAS threats are cheap, cross-border and changing fast. Cooperation has helped with norms and training but has done less to build hardware. India should pair indigenous layered systems like Akashteer with regular exercises such as KAZIND. It should also use SCO-RATS to put the Abu Dhabi Principles into practice and pursue joint development with partners. This balance supports SDG 16 (peaceful and secure societies) and India's leadership since the Delhi Declaration.