Evaluate the effectiveness of Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements as a conflict-resolution tool in India's North-East.

The SoO is a tripartite ceasefire-and-camp-management arrangement between the Centre, the State and insurgent groups — first signed with the Kuki National Organisation in 2008 [2]. Judged on outcomes, it has succeeded as an instrument of violence containment but largely failed as an instrument of political settlement.

Merits as a conflict-resolution tool

• Halts hostilities and disciplines cadres: the renegotiated pact of September 2025 relocates seven designated camps away from conflict-prone areas, reduces camp numbers and moves weapons to the nearest CRPF/BSF camps [1].
• Keeps a legal channel open: the tripartite SoO with UPF and KNO (valid 04.09.2025–03.09.2026) records the groups' commitment to Manipur's territorial integrity [1].
• Enables civil normalcy: the Kuki-Zo Council's decision to reopen National Highway-02 to free movement of commuters and goods followed this framework [6].
• Replicable template: the same ceasefire model underpins the Naga process since 1997 [3].

Limitations

• Annual renewal versus generational disputes: a one-year pact [1] cannot carry a constitutional change needing Parliament and inter-community consent; the ceasefire is re-bought, the dispute never closed.
• Basics remain unsettled: camp location, camp numbers and arms custody were reopened in 2025, seventeen years after 2008 [1].
• Renewal becomes coercive leverage: as claimed by the UPF, a message to either conclude the political settlement or wind up the pact was conveyed on 2 May 2023 — violence erupted the next day, after which the demand hardened from autonomy to separate administration [5].
• Weak State ownership: the 2025 pact was signed while Manipur was under President's Rule [4], so the State signature did not come from an elected government.
• No terminal point: Nagaland's 1997 ceasefire and 2015 Framework Agreement still await a final accord [3].

SoO therefore buys peace but does not build it. Its effectiveness would rise if ceasefires were tied to a time-bound, documented negotiation calendar, an inclusively constituted dialogue forum, and final ratification by an elected State government — converting a holding arrangement into a durable accord consistent with cooperative federalism.